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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (2002
Replacement Vol.). The court of appeals' decision, Hansen v. Evre. 2003 UT App 274, 74
P.3d 1182, was issued on July 25, 2003. (Opinion, Addendum A.) The Utah Supreme Court
granted certiorari on December 2, 2003. (Order Granting Cert., Addendum B.)
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI
Petitioners claim ten issues are on review. (See Br. of Petitioners at 1-2.) This Court
has previously admonished, however, that on certiorari only the questions set forth in the
petition for certiorari are properly before the court. See, e.g, DeBrv v. Noble. 889 P.2d 428,
443 (Utah 1995) (explaining that the "grant of a petition for certiorari does not allow a second
plenary appeal" and holding that an issue not presented in the petition for certiorari was "not
properly before this Court" in case involving counsel for Petitioners); see also Coulter &
Smith. Ltd. v. Russell 966 P.2d 852, 856 (Utah 1998) (explaining the scope of certiorari
review). Because Petitioners presented only three issues in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari,
(see Pet. for Writ of Cert., addendum E), only the following three issues are properly before
the Court:
I.

Whether the decision of Hansen v. Eyre, 2003 UT App 274, 74 P.3d 1182. in

which the court of appeals construed the Utah Traffic Control Act and held that a municipal
ordinance was invalid because it conflicted with state statute, allowed Plaintiff Due Process
as defined in Bouie v. Citv of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), and Rogers v. Tennessee, 532
U.S. 451 (2001).
1

2.

Whether the Utah Court of Appeals correctly held in Hansen v. Evre that Salt

Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070 was invalid because it conflicted with the Utah Traffic
Control Act.
3.

Whether the district court's order was properly before the Utah Court of

Appeals for decision even though Salt Lake City, the municipality that enacted the ordinance,
was not a party to the proceeding, and because the district court, according to Petitioners, did
not expressly invalidate the ordinance.1
Inasmuch as this Court did not specify on which of the three issues it granted
certiorari, Respondents address all three.

1

The scope of certiorari is to review issues on which certiorari is sought and
granted. This Court grants certiorari to review issues presented to it for review, not to
permit a second appeal. Petitioners attempt to raise issues that were not included in any
form in their Petition for Certiorari, and their attempts to reassign error to the trial court
instead of to the court of appeals are improper and must be rejected by this Court. See,
e.g.. Coulter & Smith. Ltd., 966 P.2d at 856. Issues 1 and 2 in Petitioners' brief raise the
issue of Due Process. This issue was presented, albeit somewhat differently, as the first
issue in the Petition for Certiorari and is therefore properly before this Court. Issue 3 in
Petitioners' brief addresses whether Hansen v. Evre correctly held that the Salt Lake City
Ordinance was invalid as in conflict with the Traffic Control Act. This issue was
presented as the second issue in the Petition for Certiorari and is therefore properly before
the Court. Issue 4 in Petitioners' brief questions whether the Court of Appeals properly
invalidated the Salt Lake City Ordinance even though Salt Lake City was not a party. This
issue was presented as the third issue in the petition for certiorari and is properly before
this Court. The remaining issues set forth by Petitioners, numbered 5 through 10, were
not presented in the Petition for Certiorari in any manner and therefore are not properly
before this Court. DeBrv, 889 P.2d at 443.
2

STANDARD OF REVIEW
On certiorari, this Court reviews the court of appeals' decision for correctness, giving
its conclusions of law no deference. See, e.g.. State v. Geukgeuzian. 2004 UT 16, ^|7, 494
Utah Adv. Rep. 12; Grand County v. Rogers, 2002 UT 25,1J6, 44 P.3d 734.
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION
Hansen v. Evre, 2003 UT App 274, 74 P.3d 1182, attached as Addendum A.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the court of appeals' interpretation of state legislation, the invalidity
of a conflicting municipal ordinance, and the proper application of the court of appeals'
decision to the parties before it. In Hansen v. Eyre, the Utah Court of Appeals construed the
Utah Traffic Control Act and held that because a Salt Lake City ordinance conflicted with the
Act, the ordinance was invalid. Because the court of appeals' opinion was predicable and
reasonable, the opinion did not deprive Petitioners of due process, and the court correctly
applied the law to the parties before it instead of applying the law only prospectively.
The factual background of the case involves an automobile/bicycle accident at the
intersection of 200 South and 500 East in Salt Lake City between Petitioner Tyler Hansen
("Hansen") and Respondent Amanda Eyre ("Eyre"). Eyre, an employee of The Nature
Conservancy ("Nature Conservancy"), had stopped at a red light on 500 East. Hansen, a
bicycle messenger, was riding his bicycle east in a bicycle lane painted on the improved,
asphalt surface of 200 South. Hansen had crossed the street in the middle of the block, west
of the intersection, and proceeded to ride against the flow of traffic in the bicycle lane on the
3

left-hand side of the street instead of riding with traffic in the bicycle lane on the right-hand
side of the street. Eyre, after stopping at the red light, was beginning a right-hand turn when
she collided with Hansen who was in the bicycle lane but traveling against traffic.
In the district court, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, both of
which were denied. The district court held (1) that state statutory law clearly requires
bicyclists to ride with, not against, traffic; (2) that Utah Code Section 41-6-87(3) was not an
exception to this rule; and (3) that any city ordinance to the contrary purporting to permit
bicyclists in a bicycle lane to ride against traffic is invalid. (See Dist. Ct. Minute Entry at 3,
R. 164, Addendum C.) Hansen petitioned to appeal from this interlocutory order. This Court
granted the petition and then transferred the case to the court of appeals. (See Order dated
August 23, 2002, Addendum D.)
The Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the district court, holding that to
the extent the Salt Lake City Ordinance permits a bicyclist to ride against the flow of traffic,
it is invalid. Hansen v. Evre. 2003 UT App 274, ^ 4 & 15, 74 P.3d 1182. Before the court
of appeals, Hansen asserted that Salt Lake City Ordinancel2.80.070 permitted him to ride
against the flow of traffic if he was in a designated bicycle lane. Id at If 6. Eyre and Nature
Conservancy argued that the Salt Lake City Ordinance was invalid as in conflict with state
legislation because the ordinance purported to permit riding against traffic. IcL
in its opinion, the court of appeals construed the Traffic Control Act Utah Code Ann.
§§ 41-6-1 to -186 (1998 & Supp. 2002), as it pertained to bicycle traffic. The court explained
that a bicycle constitutes a vehicle under the Act, and that bicycle paths on the area of
4

improved roadway are part of the roadway and subject to the limitations of the Traffic Control
Act. Id at 1f 10. It then concluded that uSalt Lake City may not. . . allow bicycle riders to
ride against the flow of traffic." Id at ^j 10. Regarding Section 41-6-87 of the Act, the court
of appeals construed subsection (1) to set forth a general rule requiring bicyclists to ride with
traffic, as near as practicable to the right-hand side of the roadway. Id at f 11. It also
interpreted subsection (3) to direct bicyclists to use a bicycle lane, instead of the roadway,
w hen the bicycle path is adjacent to or separate from the roadway. Id atfflf10-11. Moreover,
the court read section 41-6-53, which directs that

U4

[o]n roadways of sufficient width, a

vehicle shall be operated upon the right half of the roadway," to apply to bicycles. In sum,
bicycles "must conform with the flow of traffic applicable to all vehicles." Id at f 13.
Petitioners filed their Petition for Certiorari on September 10, 2003, raising three
issues: (1) whether the court of appeals' interpretation of the Traffic Control Act in Hansen
v. Evre was contrary to Due Process as defined in Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347
(1964), (2) whether the court of appeals correctly held that Salt Lake City Ordinance
12.80.070 was invalid because it conflicted with the Traffic Control Act as interpreted, and
(3) whether the district court's order was properly before the Court of Appeals because Salt
Lake City, the municipality that enacted the ordinance, was not a party to the proceeding
pursuant to Utah Code Section 78-33-11, and because the district court allegedly did not
expressly invalidate the ordinance. (See Pet. for Writ of Certiorari, Addendum E.)
This Court granted certiorari on December 2, 2003, to review one or more of these
issues. (See Order Granting Certiorari, Addendum B.)
5

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
First, the court of appeals' opinion did not deprive Petitioners of due process. The city
ordinance was void from its inception because it conflicted with state statutory law. Pursuant
to Supreme Court precedent on due process, the court of appeals' decision must be upheld
because the court's conclusion that Utah state statutory law prohibits bicyclists from riding
against the flow of traffic was not so unexpected or indefensible that it deprived Petitioner
of fair warning. In fact, given the statutory provisions at issue, the court of appeals' opinion
was predicable and reasonable. Because the opinion was not unexpected and indefensible,
the court of appeals also correctly applied the law to the parties instead of applying the law
only prospectively.
Second, the Utah Court of Appeals correctly construed the Utah Traffic Control Act
and correctly invalidated the Salt Lake City ordinance as in conflict with the Act.
Third, the trial court's decision invalidating the ordinance was properly before the
court of appeals for decision. Petitioners invited this alleged error, the matter was before the
court of appeals pursuant to this Court's order, the district court invalidated the city
ordinance, and Salt Lake City did not need to be a party to the lawsuit for the court to declare
the ordinance invalid.

6

ARGUMENT
I.

Hansen Was Not Denied Due Process Under Bouie v. Citv of Columbia, 378 U.S.
347 (1964), and Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001).
Hansen contends that by applying its decision in Hansen v. Eyre to him, the Utah

Court of Appeals denied him due process as defined in Bouie v. Citv of Columbia, 378 U.S.
347 (1964). He claims a constitutional right to rely on the plain language of the invalid city
ordinance, and he claims that he did not have fair warning that riding his bicycle against the
flow of traffic was proscribed by state law. (Br. of Petitioners at 16.) He maintains that the
court of appeals' ruling denied him due process of law by criminalizing behavior that he
claims was innocent when done.2 (Pet. for Cert, at 9, 16-20.)
Hansen's argument fails. First, the city ordinance was void from its inception. See
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-16 (1998 Replacement Vol.) Moreover, Petitioners misinterpret
Bouie and its progeny that set forth the parameters of due process in the context of judicial
decisionmaking. Under due process precedent, the court of appeals' decision must be upheld
because the court's conclusion that Utah law prohibits bicyclists from riding against the flow
of traffic was not so unexpected or indefensible that it deprived Hansen of fair warning.

2

Even though Petitioners refer to Due Process, they use language that is typical of
cases that discuss the Ex Post Facto Clause. To the extent Petitioners are attempting to
raise Ex Post Facto, the Ex Post Facto Clause and cases interpreting it are inapposite. Ex
Post Facto applies only to legislative actions, not judicial decisions like the instant case.
See, e.g.. Rogers v. Tennessee. 532 U.S. 451, 456 (2001) (explaining that the Ex Post
Facto Clause w'is a limitation upon the powers of the Legislature, and does not of its own
force apply to the Judicial Branch of government"). Therefore, controlling law on this
issue is the Due Process Clause and cases interpreting that clause, i.e., Bouie and Rogers.
7

A.

Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1) Was Void from its Inception
by Operation of Law

The Salt Lake City Ordinance was invalid at the time of the accident because, by
operation of law, it was void from its inception. Petitioners insist that the Salt Lake City
ordinance was valid until declared invalid by a Utah court. (Br. of Petitioners at 18.)
Petitioners suggest that it was proper for Hansen to ride against traffic on the date of the
accident because a court had not yet declared that the ordinance was invalid.

This

misrepresents the law. Pursuant to Utah state statute, the ordinance was void ab initio. Salt
Lake City had no authority under the Traffic Control Act to pass Ordinance 12.80.070, an
ordinance that conflicts with state law.
Municipalities, as political subdivisions of the state, have no inherent power because
they derive their powers from the State. See, e.g., Wisconsin Pub. Intervenorv. Mortier, 501
U.S. 597, 607-08 (1991) (stating that it is well settled that local governmental units are
created as agencies for exercising the State's governmental powers and that the governmental
powers entrusted to local governments are granted in the absolute discretion of the State), and
1 Antieau on Local Government Law § 3.01 (2d ed. 2000), cited in Kearns-Tribune Corp. v"
Salt Lake County Comm'n, 2001 UT 55, Tf21, 28 P.3d 686. Because municipalities derive all
of their powers from the State, "municipalities are wholly controlled by the state legislature,
which can establish and abolish them, provide for their government, and prescribe their
powers." Note, Conflicts Between State Statutes and Municipal Ordinances. 72 Harv. L. Rev.
737,737-38(1959).

8

In the instant case, the Utah State Legislature specifically and expressly limited the
powers of Salt Lake City with respect to municipal traffic ordinances, making the ordinance
in question void ab initio. The Traffic Control Act includes an enabling provision that
authorizes municipalities to pass laws regulating traffic, including the use of bicycles. See
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-17 (1998 Replacement Vol.) However, in the section prior to this
enabling section, the Traffic Control Act expressly mandates that "[a] local authority may not
enact or enforce any rule or ordinance in conflict with the provisions of this chapter." Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-16 (1998 Replacement Vol.) The ordinance at issue was void from its
inception because it purported to permit what the Utah Traffic Control Act prohibits—riding
a bicycle against the flow of traffic.
It is well-settled that a municipal ordinance is null and void from the beginning if it
is contrary to state law. See, e.g.. Hatch v. Boulder Town Council, 2001 UT App 55,1J16, 21
P.3d 245 (holding that town ordinance was "invalid from its inception" because it was
enacted in violation of the enabling statute); see also, e.g., Barrett v. State, 705 So. 2d 529,
531-533 (Ala. Ct. App. 1996) (citing 6 McQullin, Municipal Corporations, § 20.14 (3d. Ed.
rev. 1988), in explaining that a municipal ordinance is void if it conflicts with state statute,
affirming defendant's conviction for gambling where gambling was prohibited by state statute
but purportedly permitted by county ordinance, and rejecting defendant's contention that he
was denied Due Process because his behavior had not been declared illegal by statute or the
courts when undertaken); Village of Wilmette v. Michels, 485 N.E.2d 426, 427-28 (111. Ct.
App. 1985) (holding that municipal ordinance was invalid because it conflicted with state law,
9

reversing conviction based on violation of invalid ordinance, and rejecting argument that the
ordinance was valid at the time of the arrest); Phoenix Respirator & Ambulance Service. Inc.
v. McWilliams, 468 P.2d 951, 952-53 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1970) (holding that municipal
ordinance was invalid because it conflicted with state statute and holding that it was improper
for the trial court to base a jury instruction on the ordinance in civil wrongful death trial);
Young v. Citv of Seagoville, 421 S.W.2d 485, 486 (Texas Ct. App. 1967) (explaining that
and ordinance was "born dead-void ab initio because it was in direct conflict with . . .
constitutional and statutory provisions"); Citv of Springfield v. Stovall, 192 N.E.2d 72,72-74
(Ohio Ct. App. 1962) (reversing conviction for violating city ordinance because ordinance
was invalid as in conflict with state statute); Phenix Citv v. Putnam, 109 So. 2d 836, 837-38
(Ala. 1959) (holding that traffic ordinance under which defendant was convicted was void
from its inception as in conflict with state statute); Citv of Pelly v. Harris County Water
Control and Improvement Dist. No. 7, 195 S.W.2d 241, 242-44 (Tex. Ct App. 1946)
(affirming that a city ordinance to annex territory was void from its inception as without
authority of law); Constant v. Brown, 114 P.2d 477, 478 (Okla. 1941) (reversing civil
judgment because jury instruction was based upon a traffic ordinance that was void as in
conflict with state statute); cf Black's Law Dictionary 1574 (6th ed. 1990) (defining void ab
initio). An ordinance that is contrary to law and in conflict with state legislation is not merely
voidable upon judicial challenge, but void ab initio as a matter of law.3

3

If invalid municipal ordinances were merely voidable at the option of a litigant,
the legislature would be burdened with monitoring municipal legislation for illegal
10

Iii support of his argument that the ordinance was not void, but voidable upon judicial
challenge, Hansen cites the following Redwood Gvm v Salt Lake County Commission, 624
P2d 1138 (Utah 1981), Murray Citv v Hall 663 P 2d 1314 (Utah 1983), 56 Am Jur 2d,
Municipal Corporations § 135 (2d Ed 1971), 6 E McQuillm, The Law of Municipal
Corporations §20 41 (3ded 1980). and Regency Park L P v City of Toneka. 981 P 2d 256
(Kan 1999) For the reasons outlined below, these authonties actually support Respondents'
position
No Utah Court has ever held that an ordinance that conflicts with state legislation is
valid until declared invalid by a Utah court

To the contrary, the Traffic Control Act

mandates that such an ordinance is void ab initio

Utah Code Ann § 41-6-16 (1998

Replacement V o l ) ("A local authority may not enact or enforce any rule or ordinance in
conflict with the provisions of this chapter ") The Utah cases cited by Respondents actually
articulate the general pnnciple of law that supports Nature Conservancy's position that the
ordinance was void ab initio, and therefore invalid at the time of the accident. In Redwood
Gvm, the court upheld the long-standing pnnciple that "local governments may legislate in
ateas previously dealt with by state legislation, provided the ordinance m no way conflicts

ordinances and burdened with a duty to file suit to invalidate such ordinances Under
Petitioners' view that an illegal ordinance would remain valid until a court declared it
invalid, municipalities could theoretically pass an ordinance contrary to state statute, and
then act based on the ordinance under the argument that the ordinance must be valid until
declared invalid by a court Such a result makes little sense Instead, the law provides
that municipal ordinances that conflict with state law are void as a matter of law from their
inception
11

with state law (i.e., permitting that expressly prohibited by statute, or forbidding that
expressly permitted by statute)." Id. at 1144. The court then held that a city ordinance
prohibiting a masseuse from massaging a person of the opposite sex was valid because it was
not in conflict with any state law. Id at 1145. In Murray Citv, the court quotes McQuillin
for the general rule that "[ordinances are to be construed in the light of and in harmony with,
applicable provisions of charter, state law, constitution, and public policy." Murray City, 663
P.2d at 13 17 (quoting 6 E. McQuillin, The Law of Municipal Corporations § 20.41, at 102
(3d ed. 1980)). Applying this principle, the court held that one state DUI statute amended
another state DUI statute, and because Murray City had adopted the state DUI legislation as
its municipal ordinance framework, the same was true for the city ordinances. Murray City,
663 P.2d at 1318-19. Both of these Utah cases support the rule that a municipal ordinance
which conflicts with state law is null and void from its inception.
The non-Utah authorities also support Nature Conservancy's position that the
ordinance was void ab initio. In Regency Park, the plaintiffs paid utility charges under
ordinances that were later declared invalid. 981 P.2d at 258-59. The plaintiffs sought
reimbursement of the charges, but the court refused. I d at 259. This was because the
invalidity of the ordinance at issue "was not based on any reason making it void from its
inception/'

I d at 262. The court specifically noted that the decision was not that the

ordinances were void, but that the fees were paid voluntarily, and not under protest. IdL at
259-60. The instant case differs significantly because the ordinance was void from its
inception as in conflict with state law.
12

In sum, a municipal ordinance is null and void from the beginning if it conflicts with
state law. A party is not entitled to rely on an invalid ordinance until it is judicially declared
invalid. In the instant case, because the ordinance conflicted with the Traffic Control Act the
ordinance was void ab initio and invalid from its inception. See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-16
(1998 Replacement Vol.)
B.

Hansen Was Not Deprived of Due Process Because Hansen v. Evre
was Not so Unexpected or Indefensible that it Deprived Petitioner
of Fair Warning

Petitioners assert that Hansen was entitled to rely on the city ordinance because it
purported to permit him to ride against traffic. Petitioners cite Bouie v. Citv of Columbia4 and
argue that Hansen was denied due process because the court of appeals invalidated the
ordinance and ruled that the state legislation prohibited him from riding against traffic.
Petitioners insist Hansen had a due process right to rely on the plain language of the
ordinance, even though it was void from its inception. (Br. of Petitioners at 16.) Pursuant
to Bouie and its progeny, Petitioners' due process argument fails because the court of appeals'
decision was reasonable and predictable, and not unexpected and indefensible. The court also
correctly applied the law to Hansen instead of applying the law only prospectively.
The United States Supreme Court placed due process limits on the ability of courts to
retroactively apply judicial decisions in Bouie v. Citv of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), and

4

Noticeably absent from Petitioners' Brief is any reference to due process cases
decided since Bouie, including Rogers v. Tennessee, 532 U.S. 451 (2001), in which the
United States Supreme Court significantly clarified its holding in Bouie and further
explained due process as it relates to the retroactive application of judicial decisions.
13

Rogers v Tennessee, 532 U S 451 (2001)

The Court first held m Bouie that a judicial

decision would violate the Due Process Clause if two conditions were present

(1) the

decision retroactively expanded narrow and precise language of a criminal statute, id_ at 35253, and (2) the judicial interpretation was so "unexpected and indefensible'' that the defendant
was not on tair warning that the conduct at issue was a crime, id_ at 354 * In Rogers, the
Supreme Court clarified the holding of Borne In Rogers, the Supreme Court first clarified
that any limitations on judicial decisionmaking are based on the Due Process Clause, not the
Ex Post Facto Clause, because the Ex Post Facto Clause "is a limitation upon the powers of
the Legislature, and does not of its own force apply to the Judicial Branch of government"
Rogers, 532 U S at 456 (quoting Marks v United States. 430 U S 188. 191 (1977)) The
Rogers Court also identified the "basic principle that a criminal statute must give fair warning

' In Bouie v Citv of Columbia, two African-American men were arrested for
criminal trespass at a lunch counter Id_ at 348 The South Carolina criminal trespass
statute prohibited an individual from entering land after he or she was notified that entry
onto the land was prohibited The men were arrested, however, not for entering after
being told entry was prohibited, but for refusing to leave after being asked to leave
Notwithstanding, the South Carolina Supreme Court construed the statute so broadly that
it also made criminal remaining on the premises after having been asked to leave Id. at
348-49 The United States Supreme Court held that this decision violated due process
First, the decision retroactively expanded narrow and precise statutory language that
defined the crime of criminal trespass Id. at 355 The statute narrowly prohibited entry
upon land after being told not to enter, and the court expanded the crime to include
remaining on the premises after being asked to leave Id. Second, the South Carolina
court's interpretation of the statute was so "unexpected and indefensible" that the
defendants were not on fair warning that the conduct at issue was a crime The state
court's construction of the statute was "clearly at variance with the statutory language,"
and it did not have even "the slightest support m prior South Carolina decisions " Id_ at
356
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of the conduct that it makes a crime,'1 and noted that deprivation of fair warning can result
from a judicial decision that unforeseeably and retroactively expands a statute. The Court
then explained that the South Carolina court's decision in Bouie violated due process because
the state court's interpretation of the criminal statute was both "unexpected and indefensible
by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct." IcL at 457 (internal
quotations omitted).6 Rogers then held that the Tennessee Supreme Court's retroactive
application of its decision in State v. Rogers, 992 S.W.2d 393 (Tenn. 1999), did not violate
due process because the decision was not an unforeseeable, arbitrary decision that constituted
an unexpected and indefensible departure from prior law. Rogers v. Tennessee. 532 U.S. at
466-67.
State courts presented with this issue have followed Rogers. For example, in State v.
Redmond, 631 N.W.2d 501 (Neb. 2001), cert, denied, 534 U.S. 1033, the Nebraska Supreme
Court upheld the retroactive application of a judicial decision in a capital murder case. In

6

In Rogers v. Tennessee, a defendant was convicted of murdering a victim who
died fifteen months after the defendant stabbed him. 532 U.S. at 454. At the time of both
the stabbing and defendant's conviction, Tennessee common law provided that no
defendant could be convicted of murder unless the victim died within a year and a day of
the defendant's act. Id. Notwithstanding, the Tennessee Court of Appeals still affirmed
the conviction, holding that the year-and-a day rule had been abolished by statute. IcL at
454-55. The Tennessee Supreme Court affirmed on alternate grounds, holding that the
year-and-a-day rule had not been abolished by statute, but that it no longer existed at
common law. IcL at 455. After explaining Bouie and the law on Due Process, the United
States Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Tennessee Supreme Court's retroactive
application of its decision abolishing the year-and-a-day rule did not deny the defendant
due process. IcL at 462. This was because the Tennessee Supreme Court's decision was
not an unforeseeable, arbitrary decision that constituted an unexpected and indefensible
departure from prior law. IcL at 466-67.
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Redmond, the defendant was convicted of second degree murder. I d at 503. When the
killing occurred, malice was an essential element of the crime. After the killing, a Nebraska
Supreme Court decision. State v. Burlison. 583 N.W.2d 31 (Neb. 1998), overruled the prior
Nebraska law and held that malice was no longer an essential element. I d In Redmond, the
rule ofBurlison was applied retroactively, and the defendant was convicted of second degree
murder without a finding of malice. I d On appeal, the Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that the retroactive application of the new rule of the Burlison decision was not a
denial of due process. After explaining the holdings of both Bouie and Rogers, the Nebraska
Supreme Court stated that "a judicial decision interpreting a statute may be applied
retroactively unless the decision denies due process by being both unexpected and
indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the conduct in issue,"
and held that retroactive application of the Burlison decision was neither unexpected, nor
indefensible. I d at 508 (emphasis in original). In other words, unless the court's decision
is both unexpected and indefensible, it should be applied "retroactively" to the parties before
the court. See id; see also, e.g.. State v. Brocuglio, 826 A.2d 145, 155-56 (Conn. 2003)
(construing Rogers and explaining that a judicial decision that "deviates] from numerous
cases by [Connecticut's] appellate courts" constitutes a sufficiently

"marked and

unpredictable" departure from prior precedent that is sufficient to violate due process).
In sum, for a state court's interpretation and retroactive application of a statute to
violate due process, the decision must (1) retroactively expand narrow and precise language
of the statute, and (2) the court's interpretation must be clearly at odds with the plain language
16

of the statute and have no support in prior state judicial decisions such that the decision is
both "unexpected and indefensible" such that the defendant was not on fair warning that the
conduct at issue was a crime. See; Rogers, 532 U.S. at 458; Borne, 378 U.S. at 352-54; see
also McDonald v. Champion. 962 F.2d 1455, 1458 (10th Cir. 1992) (explaining that before
a judicial interpretation violates due process, the judicial decision must unforeseeably expand
a criminal statute, and the construction must be both unexpected and indefensible); Redmond,
631 N.W.2d at 508, cert, denied. 534 U.S. 1033.
The second part of this test is dispositive. "Rogers sets forth a two-pronged test for
whether retroactive application of a judicial decision violates due process, and both prongs
must be satisfied for a constitutional violation to be proved. If one prong of the test is
unsatisfied, then the inquiry can end." State v. Davlin, 639 N.W.2d 631, 641 (Neb. 2002).
Due process has not been violated in this case because the court of appeals' decision in
Hansen v. Evre was not so unexpected and indefensible that Hansen was not on fair warning
that riding his bicycle against the flow of traffic was against the law.
First the Utah Court of Appeals' decision in Hansen v. Evre is not indefensible. To
the contrary, the decision is predictable and well-reasoned. "Indefensible is defined as
w

incapable of being maintained as right or valid' or 'incapable of being justified or excused."'

Redmond. 631 N.W.2d at 508 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary,
Unabridged 1147 (1993)). For the reasons explained more fully in Section II below, Hansen
v. Evre is certainly capable of being justified as correct First, the court of appeals logically
concluded that a bicycle is a vehicle under the Traffic Control Act. Hansen. 2003 UT App
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274 at 1| 9, 74 P.3d 1182. Then, the court rationally determined that where a bicycle lane is
painted on the improved asphalt portion of a roadway, the bicycle lane is actually part of the
roadway, not adjacent to it.7 Hansen, 2003 UT App 274 at fflf 9 & 12, 74 P.3d 1182. The
court noted that Section 41-6-53 of the Act requires vehicles to be operated on the right half
of the roadway, and it then reasonably interpreted section 41-6-87(1) to require bicyclists to
ride on the right-hand side of the road and not "against the flow of traffic." Hansen, 2003 UT
App 274 at ^ 10-11, 74 P.3d 1182 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-53). The court held that
subsection (3) of 41-6-87, which provided that a bicycle riders must use a bicycle path when
one exists adjacent to a roadway, was inapplicable because Hansen was riding in a bicycle
lane that was part of the improved roadway. IdL at Tf 13. Finally, because the Salt Lake City
Ordinance purported to permit a bicyclist to ride against the flow of traffic in a bicycle lane
that was part of a roadway, the court declared the ordinance as in conflict with the Act and
therefore invalid. Id, at f 15. Given this reasoning, the court of appeals' decision is far from
indefensible.
Moreover, Hansen v. Evre was hardly unexpected. Given the statutory definitions and
provisions at issue, the decision was very predictable. Section 41-6-1(55) of the Traffic

7

The dissent disagrees, suggesting that where a bicycle path is painted on the
improved roadway, the path is adjacent to the roadway. Hansen, 2003 UT App 274 at ^
18-20, 74 P.3d 1182. Based on this assumption, the dissent would have permitted the Salt
Lake City Ordinance to stand and allowed bicyclists to ride against the flow of traffic in
bicycle lanes painted on the improved portion of the roadway. I d at ^f 24.
Notwithstanding this disagreement, the dissent acknowledges that "the majority opinion
makes a persuasive case for affirming the trial court's decision." id at ^17, attesting to the
fact that the majority opinion is rational, logical, and far from indefensible.
18

Control Act defines vehicle as uevery device in, upon, or by which any person or property is
or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices used exclusively upon
stationary rails or tracks." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-1(55) (1998), quoted in Hansen, 2003 UT
App 274 at ^ 9, 74 P.3d 1182. Unsurprisingly, the court concluded that a bicycle is a vehicle
under the Act. The Act also defined roadway, as "that portion of highway improved,
designated, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the sidewalk, berm, or
shoulder, even though any of them are used by persons riding bicycles or other humanpowered vehicles." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-1(39) (1998), quoted in Hansen, 2003 UT App
274 at 1f 9, 74 P.3d 1182. Given this definition, the court of appeals predictably determined
that the bicycle lane painted on the asphalt surface in which Hansen was riding was part of
the roadway. Id Further, the court predictably interpreted statutory sections of the Act to
prohibit bicycling against the flow of traffic. Utah Code Section 41 -6-53 directs that vehicles
must be operated on the right half of the roadway. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-53, quoted in
Hansen, 2003 UT App 274 atffif10-11, 74 P.3d 1182. Section 41-6-87(1) also sets forth a
general rule requiring bicyclists to ride "as near as practicable to the right-hand edge of the
roadway." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87(1) (1998 Replacement). Subsection (1) sets forth three
exceptions to this general rule permitting riding away from the right-hand edge, but none
applied to the instant case. In light of these statutes, it is no surprise that the court of appeals
held that bicyclists must ride with the flow of traffic on the right hand side of the road when
a bicycle lane is painted onto the improved portion of the roadway. Because the Salt Lake
City Ordinance purported to permit bicycling against the flow of traffic in a bicycle lane on
19

the roadway, the court of appeals held that the Salt Lake City Ordinance was invalid. IcL at
*,fl[ 10, 15. Inasmuch as the court of appeals' decision predictably followed the statutory
provisions in a logical, rational way, the decision is not so unexpected that it violated due
process. 8
Under the test of Rogers v. Tennessee, the application of the court of appeals'
interpretation of the Traffic Control Act in Hansen v. Evre to the parties before it does not
violate due process because the decision is neither indefensible or unexpected. It makes sense
that a judicial decision should be applied "retroactively," i.e., applied to the parties before the
court, unless the decision is patently unexpected and indefensible. Judicial interpretation is
necessary to our system of law. Moreover, "retroactive" application ofjudicial interpretations
is also necessary and proper in our common law system. From the traditional perspective that

s

In his due process argument, Hansen also contends that "[t]he law certainly
cannot expect a lay person to realize that there might be a conflict between a city
ordinance that expressly allows bicycles in the left bicycle lane and a state law." (Br. of
Petitioners at 20.) If this statement were the law, it would also be true, however, that
Hansen did not even knew that the ordinance purporting to permit his conduct existed.
Regardless, a fundamental principal of our justice system is that ignorance of the law is no
excuse, and therefore citizens are deemed to be on notice of the law. See, e.g.. United
States v. Int'l Minerals & Chemical Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 562-63 (1971); United States v.
Reddick. 203 F.3d 767, 770-71 (10th Cir. 2000); State v. Marshall, 2003 UT App 381, %
18, 81 P.3d 775 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-304(2) (1999), for the well-settled
proposition that ignorance of the law is no defense). Moreover,"the law is full of
instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly . . . . [and] the criterion in
such cases is to examine whether common social duty would, under the circumstances,
have suggested a more circumspect conduct" Nash v United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377
(1931). As a result, Hansen's alleged ignorance of the law is no excuse, he is deemed to
have been on notice of the statute prohibiting his conduct, and he certainly had fair notice
that crossing the street in the middle of the block and riding a bicycle against the flow of
traffic is contrary to common, circumspect conduct.
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judges "find" the law and apply it to the cases before them, retroactive application is rightly
the norm. In our system, the courts are routinely asked to interpret and apply statutory
language that oftentimes is unclear. The judiciary must have flexibility to interpret law and
determine what the law is. At the same time, the judiciary must also be able to apply the law
to the cases and controversies before it. If courts are not permitted to apply the law
retrospectively, and only prospectively, they will be severely restricted in their ability to
decide cases and controversies. If courts are limited to interpreting statutes and determining
what the common law is without being able to apply that law as interpreted to the parties
before them, our judicial system would be turned on end. Without retroactive application of
the law, courts would essentially become lawmakers or intepreters of the law only for future
cases, instead of resolvers of disputes in present cases. Indeed, retroactive application is
necessary for courts to interpret the law and apply it to cases before it. In other words, if
judicial decisions were not applied retroactively, "this would place an unworkable and
unacceptable restraint on normal judicial processes and would be incompatible with the
resolution of uncertainty that marks any evolving legal system." Rogers, 532 U.S. at 461.
Accordingly, when judicial bodies "create" new law, the Due Process Clause prohibits
retroactive application of "new" law that is unexpected and indefensible in light of prior
precedent. However, where the judiciary acts within its power to interpret lawr or determine
what the common law precedent is, due process does not prohibit retroactive application to
the parties, especially when the interpretation is reasonable.
As a result, the Supreme Court has "restricted due process limitations on the
21

retroactive application of judicial interpretations of criminal statutes to those that are
u

unexpected and indefensible by reference to the law which had been expressed prior to the

conduct in issue.'" Rogers, 532 U.S. at 461 (quoting Bouie, 378 U.S. at 354). In other words,
retroactive application to the disputing parties before the court is the general rule, with Bouie
and Rogers ensuring due process by permitting appellate judges to intervene in egregious,
extreme cases to prevent arbitrary rulings by lower courts that are unexpected and
indefensible.
In this instant case, the Utah Court of Appeals did not violate due process by creating
new law that was both unexpected and indefensible in light of prior precedent. To the
contrary, the court of appeals reasonably and predictably interpreted legislation and applied
it to the controversy before it.9

9

This Court should not conduct an independent state due process analysis because
Petitioners offer no independent state due process analysis. This court has previously held
that Utah appellate courts should not conduct an independent state constitutional analysis
if a party fails to proffer an explanation regarding how the state analysis would differ from
the federal due process analysis. State v. Trane, 2002 UT 97, f21 n.2, 57 P.3d 1052
(refusing to conduct an independent analysis under the Utah Constitution even though the
federal and state analyses were not identical because the parties did not argue for a
separate state constitutional analysis); see also State v. Bean. 869 P.2d 984,988-89 (Utah
Ct. App. 1994) (refusing to conduct a state constitutional analysis because a party offered
no rationale why the state analysis should differ from the federal analysis); State v. Carter.
8 i 2 P.2d 460, 462 n. 1 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) ( u [w]here a [party] fails to support his state
constitutional argument with analysis or authority, this court will not address it.") In the
instant case, Petitioners have not even mentioned the possibility of an independent state
analysis, much less offered any reasons or authority why a state due process analysis
should differ from the federal analysis.

II.

The Utah Court of Appeals Correctly Held that Salt Lake City Ordinance
12.80.070 was Invalid Because it Conflicted with State Statute, the Utah Traffic
Control A c t
Hansen v. Evre reasonably construes the Traffic Control Act as it relates to bicycle

traffic and affirms the well-accepted, long-standing rule that municipal ordinances that
conflict with state statutes are void ab initio. As outlined in brief above, the court of appeals
explained that a bicycle constitutes a vehicle under the Act, and that a bicycle path painted
on an improved roadway surface is part of the roadway and subject to the limitations of the
Act. Hansen, 2003 UT App 274 at H 10, 74 P.3d 1182. Then, the court properly held that
under the Utah Code, specifically Sections 41-6-53 and -87, u Salt Lake City may not . . .
allow bicycle riders to ride against the flow of traffic," and it correctly declared invalid the
ordinance purporting to permit bicycling against traffic. IcL at ^f 10.
Given the statutory provisions at issue, this was the correct result. Under Utah Code
Section 41-6-1(55), a bicycle is a vehicle under the Traffic Control Act. I d at ^f 9 (quoting
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-1(55) (1998)). Additionally, Utah Code Section 41-6-1(39) specifies
that the bicycle lane painted on the improved asphalt surface of the roadway in which Hansen
was riding was part of the roadway for purposes of the Traffic Control Act. Id, (quoting Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-1(39) (1998)). With these definitions set forth, the Court then correctly
interpreted Utah Code Section 41-6-87 and declared invalid the Salt Lake City Ordinance as
in conflict.
Section 41-6-87 proclaims the general rule that bicyclists are prohibited from riding
against the flow of traffic. The court of appeals correctly determined that Section 41-6-87
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sets forth a general rule of right-hand bicycle travel. Subsection 41-6-87(1) directs that a
person operating a bicycle on a roadway must ride as near as practicable to the right hand
edge unless one of three exceptions exists. Under these exceptions, a bicyclist may move
away from the right-hand edge when (a) overtaking another bicycle, (b) preparing to make
a left-hand turn at an intersection, or (c) if it is reasonably necessary to avoid dangerous
conditions or obstacles. Hansen, 2003 UT App 274 at ^f 11, 74 P.3d 1182. None of these
exceptions is applicable to the instant case, however. Therefore, subsection (1) required
Hansen to ride as close to the right-hand edge of the roadway as possible. Said otherwise, the
statute prohibited Hansen from riding "against the flow of traffic." Id. at ^ 10. This is the
proper conclusion, especially when considered in light of Section 41-6-53. Section 41-6-53
directs that "on roadways of sufficient width a vehicle [such as a bicycle as defined] shall be
operated upon the right half of the roadway." I d at^j 11 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-53)
(1998 Replacement)).
Contrary to Petitioners' assertions, Section 41-6-87(3) is not an exception to the righthand rule, nor is the Salt Lake City Ordinance an exception. Petitioner argues that subsection
(3) is an exception to the right-hand rule of subsection(l). (See Br. of Petitioners at 12.2628.) This is not the case. The exceptions to the general right-hand rule of subsection (1) are
found in subsections (l)(a), (l)(b), and (l)(c). See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87(1) (1998
Replacement). The court of appeals correctly explained that subsection (3) sets forth a
different rule, one that applies when a bicycle path exists adjacent to and separate from the
improved roadway.

Subsection (3) directs bicyclists to use a bicycle path and not the
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roadway, uw[i]f a usable path for bicycles has been provided adjacent to a roadway/' Utah
Code Ann. § 41-6-87(3) (1998 Replacement). Hansen v. Evre correctly determined that
subsection (3) did not apply because the bicycle path Hansen was riding in was "part of the
roadway and not adjacent to it." Hansen, 2003 UT App 274 at ^ 11, 74 P.3d 1182. "Only
when the [bicycle] path is adjacent to (i.e., separate from) the roadway is a rider required to
use the path instead of the right hand edge of the roadway." IcL at f 12. Thus, because
Hansen was riding in a bicycle lane that was painted on the blacktopped, improved portion
of a road, and not in a bicycle path separate or apart from this improved portion of the
roadway, he was required to ride on the right-hand side of the road and was prohibited from
riding against the flow of traffic.10
Additionally, the ordinance cannot constitute an exception to the statutory rule. It is
well-accepted that where a municipal ordinance is in conflict with a state statute, the
ordinance is invalid from its inception. First, the Traffic Control Act mandates that "[a] local
authority may not enact or enforce any rule or ordinance in conflict with the provisions of [the
Traffic Control Act]." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-16 (1998 Replacement). Second, the court of
appeals' decision that the Salt Lake City Ordinance is invalid as in conflict with the Traffic

10

Petitioners present as part of their argument, nearly verbatim, the dissenting
opinion of Judge Jackson in Hansen v. Evre. (See Br. of Petitioners at 27-30.) The
dissent is based, however, on the premise that where a bicycle path is painted on the
improved roadway, the path is not actually part of the roadway but adjacent to it. Hansen,
2003 UT App 274 atfflf18-20, 74 P.3d 1182. This is contrary to the definition of roadway
in Utah Code Section 41-6-1(39). The correct interpretation is that of the majority opinion
as set forth above.
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Control Act is in harmony with prior case law. See, e.g., Salt Lake Citv v. Kusse. 97 Utah
113, 117-19, 93 P.2d 671, 673 (1938) (citing other jurisdictions and setting forth test for
determining whether an ordinance conflicts with state statute); see also Redwood Gvm v. Salt
Lake County Comm'n, 624 P.2d 1138, 1144 (Utah 1981) (stating that municipalities may
legislate by ordinance, "provided the ordinance in no way conflicts with existing state law");
Walker v. Union Pac. RR. Co.. 844 P.2d 335, 339-40 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (stating that local
governments may legislate by ordinance provided "the ordinance in no way conflicts with
existing state law," and holding ordinance invalid as preempted by state law because it
purports to prohibit what state statute permits); Hornsbv v. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-dav Saints, 758 P.2d 929, 934 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)
(affirming refusal to give jury instructions because requested instruction on negligence per
se would have been based on ordinance that was void as in conflict with Utah Code Section
41-6-16); State v. Lineman. 97 Utah 180, 186-88, 91 P.2d 457, 460-61 (1939) (holding
ordinance invalid as contrary to state law and therefore negligence instruction based upon
invalid ordinance was improper).
Petitioners argue that the power given to municipalities to adopt ordinances under
Section 41-6-17 "is subject only to the reasonable exercise of the police power." (See Br. of
Petitioners at 11 & 23-30.) Petitioners assert that "[t]he only limitation [the Utah] Legislature
has placed on the right of cities to regulate the operation of bicycles on city streets is that a
city reasonably exercise the police power." (Br. ofPetitionersat25.) Nowhere in Petitioners'
brief, however, is any reference to Utah Code Section 41-6-16. This section of the Traffic
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Control Act unambiguously declares that u[a] local authority may not enact or enforce any
rule or ordinance in conflict with the provisions of this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-16
(1998 Replacement Vol.) Because of this statutory prohibition that a municipality may not
enact an ordinance that conflicts with the Traffic Control Act, the Salt Lake City ordinance
was invalid from its inception.
Petitioners argue "[t]he Trial Court determined the Respondents had failed to present
any evidence which could serve as a basis to invalidate Ordinance 12.80.070, and failed to
show that the Ordinance was not a proper exercise of the police power granted under Utah
Code Ann. Section 41-6-17(l)(h)." (Br. of Petitioners at 25.) First, the issue of police power
is not properly before this Court because this issue was not raised in the petition for certiorari.
See, e.g. Coulter & Smith, Ltd.. 966 P.2d at 856; DeBry, 889 P.2d at 443. Second, Petitioners
misstate the trial court's holding. The trial court actually explained that its decision was
purely one of statutory construction, and that it did not pass judgment on whether Salt Lake
City properly exercised its police powers. The trial court stated, 'The court is not ruling on
that aspect [the issue of police powers]

The SLC ordinance thus appears to not be within

reasonable police powers to attempt to allow such dangerous conduct. Those comments,
however, are not governing in this case." (Minute Entry Order, R. 164, Addendum C
(emphasis added).) Instead of passing judgment on whether or not Salt Lake City properly
exercised its police powers, the trial court construed the state legislation, holding that "it is
directly against the Utah statute to travel by bicycle against the flow of vehicle traffic/'
(Minute Entry Order, R. 164, Addendum C.)
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Nature Conservancy and Amanda Eyre should not be liable because Salt Lake City
passed an invalid ordinance. If invalid ordinances were deemed valid and binding until set
aside by legal proceedings, municipalities could routinely pass ordinances in conflict with
state statute, and then parties, including municipalities, could act contrary to law under the
purported authority of the invalid ordinance until the ordinance is challenged and declared
invalid by the courts. Such a result is contrary to established law and not in harmony with our
judicial system.11
III.

The District Court's Decision was Properly Before the Court of Appeals
Petitioners claim the matter was not properly before the court of appeals because Salt

Lake City was not made a party in the district court. (Br. of Petitioners at 34.) Petitioners
never argued to the district court that Salt Lake City should have been added as a party.
Moreover. Petitioners never even argued to the court of appeals that Salt Lake City should
have been a party. Because this issue was never presented to the district court or the court of
appeals, neither court opined on it. This issue was raised for the first time in the Petition for
Certiorari to this Court. As a result, there is no decision by the court of appeals on this issue
that can be reviewed on certiorari. Because this Court did not specify on which issues it
granted certiorari, however, Respondents address this issue.

1

' Finally, it is noteworthy that after Salt Lake City understood that Ordinance
12.80.070 was invalid, it amended the ordinance to comport with Section 41-6-87. (See
Ordinance Amending Section 12.80.070, Addendum F.) Amended Ordinance 12.80.070,
Subsection B adopted the language from Utah Code Section 41-6-87. Then, so as to
eliminate any possible confusion, Subsection C clarifies that a bicyclist may not travel
against traffic, even in a bicycle lane like the one in question.
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A.

The District Court's Decision was Properly Before the Court of Appeals
Because this Court Granted Petitioners' Interlocutory Appeal and
Transferred the Case to the Court of Appeals

Petitioners' final point is that the validity of the Salt Lake City Ordinance was not
properly before the court of appeals for decision. This argument is disingenuous. It was
Petitioners themselves who requested that the issue be decided on an interlocutory appeal.
Petitioners asked for appellate review of the district court's decision. Petitioners cannot now
claim that the decision was not properly before the appellate court. Such invited error must
be rejected. See, .e.g.. Cheves v. Williams, 1999 UT 86, 1f 20, 993 P.2d 191; Miller v.
Martmeau & Co.. Certified Pub. Accountants, 1999 UT App 216, U 42, 983 P.2d 1107
(quotations and citations omitted).
Moreover, the case was before the court of appeals pursuant to this Court's Order.
(Order Granting Certiorari, Addendum B.) The district court denied Petitioners' motion for
summary judgment and concluded that jury instructions would be tailored reflecting the state
statute—Hansen did not have the right to bicycle against the flow of traffic, and the ordinance
was invalid because it conflicted with the statute. Petitioners requested that this decision be
reviewed on appeal. This Court granted Petitioners' request for an interlocutory appeal and
instructed the court of appeals to review the decision. Petitioners cannot legitimately claim
that the matter was not properly before the court of appeals.
B.

The District Court Invalidated the Ordinance

Petitioners claim the district court order was not properly before the court of appeals
because the district court allegedly "refused to invalidate the ordinance." (Br. of Petitioners'
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at 17; Pet. for Cert, at 16-17.) This misconstrues the district court's decision. The trial court
held that the ordinance was invalid when he denied Hansen's motion for summary judgment.
The trial court's decision reads, in relevant part:
The court finds that state law was and is (and probably always has been)
clear that bicycles are to ride in the direction of motor vehicle traffic. .. . The
court reads [the law] to mean that bicycles are still to ride with traffic, and if
there is a bicycle lane, the bicycles should use the lane rather than the roadway.
Subsection (3) of 41-6-87 does not give license to travel against traffic even in
a bicycle lane.
An ordinance that purports to allow otherwise is in conflict with such
state law.
. . . [I]t is directly against the Utah statute to travel by bicycle against the
flow of vehicle traffic.
The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that plaintiff
was not justified by ordinance nor state law in traveling in the direction he was
against traffic.
(Minute Entry Order, R. 164, Addendum C.)

In denying summary judgment, the district

court held the ordinance was invalid. Hansen asked for a ruling that the ordinance permitted
him to ride against traffic in the bicycle lane. This was denied. The district court specifically
held that state legislation prohibited bicycling against the flow of traffic. The district court
also expressly stated that any ordinance that purports to allow otherwise conflicts with state
law. In denying the Plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment the court necessarily
held that because the ordinance conflicts with state legislation, the ordinance was invalid.
C.

Salt Lake City was not a Necessary Party Where the Ordinance was
Attacked Collaterally

Petitioners also contend that the court of appeals should not have determined the Salt
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Lake City Ordinance was invalid because Salt Lake City should have been made a party under
Utah Code Section 78-33-11 of the Utah Declaratory Judgments Act. (See Br. of Petitioners
at 34; Pet. for Cert, at 15-17.)
The instant action was never a declaratory judgment action. As a result, Section 7833-11 of the Utah Declaratory Judgments Act is inapplicable. Section 78-33-11 requires a
municipality to be named a party if a declaratory judgment action is brought to declare a
municipal ordinance invalid. Because the instant action was not a declaratory judgment
action, it was not necessary that the municipality be made a party.
Moreover, even if the instant action had been a declaratory judgment action, just
because the municipal entity was not a party did not deprive the court of appeals of
jurisdiction and prevent it from deciding the issue. See Hemenwav & Moser Co. v. Funk, 100
Utah 72, 77. 106 P.2d 779, 781 (1940) (noting prior version of section 78-33-11 required
attorney general to be served in declaratory judgment action challenging constitutionality of
Liquor Control Act, but proceeding to address the issue of the statute's constitutionality).
Additionally, the Salt Lake City ordinance was subject to collateral attack in this case
without Salt Lake City as a party because the ordinance was void ab initio. Hansen invoked
the authority of the void ordinance by requesting a jury instruction based upon it. If an
ordinance is void, it may always be collaterally attacked, and a void ordinance is subject to
direct or collateral attack whenever its authority is invoked in a judicial proceeding. See, e.g..
Willow Park v. Bryant. 763 S.W.2d 506, 508 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) ("The law is well settled
that a collateral attack is proper where... the ordinances are void.") (citations omitted); Dep't
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of Public Works & Bldgs. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank. 334N.E.2d810, 818 (111. Ct. A pp. 1975).
Willow Park provides guidance here. In Willow Park, the plaintiff alleged that the matter was
not properly before the court because the attorney general was not made a party to the lawsuit
as required by statute. 763 S.W.2d at 508. A Texas statute provided that in any proceeding
involving the validity of a municipal ordinance, the municipality must be made a party and
the attorney general must also be served with a copy of the proceeding and is entitled to be
heard. Id The attorney general was never served or given an opportunity to be heard. Id
Nevertheless, the court held that the collateral attack was still proper because the ordinance
was void ab initio. Id at 508-09. Similarly, in the instant case, even though the declaratory
judgment statute states requires that a municipality be made a party in a direct attack or
declaratory judgment action, Salt Lake City was not a necessary party because the city
ordinance was void ab initio and subject to collateral attack.
This is not the first time that an ordinance has been declared invalid in Utah without
including the governmental entity that promulgated the ordinance as a party. Utah courts
have, on numerous occasions, determined that ordinances are invalid without including the
municipality as a party. See, e.g.. Walker, 844 P.2d at 339-40; Hornsbv, 758 P.2d at 934-35;
Lingman, 97 Utah at 186-88, 91 P.2d at 460-61. In Walker, like the instant case, the district
court refused to give jury instructions based upon a Salt Lake City Ordinance, holding that
the ordinance was invalid because it conflicted with state statute. 844 P.2d at 339-40. The
decision was affirmed on appeal despite the fact that Salt Lake City was not a party. Id In
Hornsbv, also like the instant case, the district court refused to give jury instructions because
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the requested instruction would have been based on a Salt Lake County ordinance that was
void as in conflict with state statute. 758 P.2d at 934-35. The decision was affirmed despite
the fact that Salt Lake County was not a party. IcL In Lingman, the district court refused to
give an instruction because the requested instruction was based upon a Salt Lake City
ordinance that was invalid. 97 Utah at 186-188, 460-61. The decision was affirmed even
though Salt Lake County was not a party. IcL The instant case is just like these three cases.
The district court determined that the Salt Lake City ordinance was invalid and refused to give
jury instructions based on the ordinance. (See Minute Entry of the District Court, R. 164,
Addendum C.) The Utah Court of Appeals, while not presented with this issue, nevertheless
affirmed.
IV.

Other Issues Alleged by Petitioners Are Not Properly Before This Court
Finally, Petitioner alleges several errors by the district court. Nature Conservancy

reiterates that these issues are not properly before this Court because they were not raised in
the Petition for Certiorari. See, e.g. Coulter & Smith, Ltd.. 966 P.2d 852, 856 (citing, inter
alia, DeBrv v.Noble, 889 P.2d 428 (Utah 1995), and Butterfield v. Okubo. 831 P.2d 97 (Utah
1992), for the proposition that review on certiorari is limited to examining the court of
appeals' decision, and issues not raised in the petition for certiorari are not properly before
the Court).
CONCLUSION
First, Hansen was not deprived of due process. The Salt Lake City ordinance was void
from its inception because it conflicted with state statutory law. Additionally, Hansen
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received due process because, under Bouie and Rogers, the court of appeals' decision was not
so unexpected or indefensible that it deprived Petitioner of fair warning. To the contrary,
given the statutory provisions at issue, the opinion was reasonable and predicable. Second,
the Utah Court of Appeals correctly construed the Utah Traffic Control Act and correctly
invalidated the Salt Lake City ordinance as in conflict with the Act. Third, the trial court's
decision invalidating the ordinance was properly before the court of appeals for decision.
Petitioners invited the error they allege, the matter was before the court of appeals pursuant
to this Court's order, the district court properly invalidated the city ordinance, and Salt Lake
City did not need to be a party for the court to invalidate the ordinance.
The decision of the court of appeals should be affirmed.
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Addendum A

Court of Appeals' Decision
Hansen v. Eyre. 2003 UT App 274, 74 P.3d 1182

Utah Court of Appeals
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publication in the Pacific Reporter.
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F I L E D
( J u l y 2 5 , 2003)
i2003 UT Aoc 2 74

Defendants and Aooellees.

Third District:, Murray Department
The Honorable Bruce Lubeck
Attorneys:

Edward T. Wells and Mel S. Martin, Mur-v - c Appellant
~~-' ~ ~
Lloyd R. Jones, Robert L. Janicki, and Mi-- = -I ~<
Woolley, Salt Lake City, for Appellees

Berore Judges Jackson, Greenwood, and Thome.
THORNS, Judge:
Hi
Appellants Tyler Hansen and the Workers' Comoe-«Mcn F ^ d
appeal t n e t n a l court's denial of their motion f o r ' D ^ t ? ^
summary judgment. We affirm.
^-- —
BACKGROUND
<f2
Cn February 17, 2000, Hansen was riding his bicycle
eastbcund, on the left hand side of the street and against t
atnsi
flow of traffic, but w ^ r ^ ~ t-h<=. r-^^--r^~ -- -~- •
patn.
~s r.e approached t h e i n c e r s e c c i o r . of 200 Scu^- = ~ - C Q o
aSS
= - Ama^sa- Syre was w a i t i n g i n her car f a r t b * f i ^
'""
wescoound t r a f f i c t o s u b s i d e so t h a t she could " t u - - : ° ^ , „ . .
._ne wes-oounc l a n e cf 200 South. When Evre was s a t ' ^ T ^
Z ^
r-s rlow of t r a f f i c was s u f f i c i e n t l y l i c h t t o I l l o w W ^ o
u c c s s s r u l x y make h e r r i g h t t u r n , she a c c e l e r a t e d a - c u ^ d I s omer.
However, b e f o r e Eyre could corrolp*-* h « - t u ^
J - - t~*
lansen c o l l i d e d , i n j u r i n g Hansen. When' ^ a c c i d e n t c ^ u r r e l ?

both Hansen and Eyre were operating within the scoce of their
employment.
fa
Following the accident, Hansen, along with the Workers'
Compensation Fund, filed suit. In essence, Hansen claimed t'^at
Eyre had violated various sections of the Utah Code, ard~at i""st
one provision of the Salt Lake City ordinances, thereby causinc
the accident.^ Hansen filed a motion for partial summary
""
judgment, asking the trial court to rule that Hansen "had a lecal
right to ride a bicycle in an eastbound direction in the"
designated bicycle lane on the north side of 200 South Street in
Salt Lake City." Hansen based his motion on Salt Lak=> O t v "ut"
Ordinance 12.80.070 (Supp. 1993) which reads, in relevant part: "
"It is^unlawful for operators of bicycles: . . . [t]o ride upon
the
, -sft-hand side of any street, except when they are within a
marked bicycle lane or when riding upon a one-wav street."
%A Eyre opposed Hansen's motion, arguing that the Salt Lake
City Ordinance conflicted with state law and, therefore" Farse-*
could not havei a right to ride against the flow of "traffic a V a
matter^or lav/.- Che trial court entertained oral argument 'and
then, in a written decision, denied Hansen's motion." ""-""its"
decision, the trial court determined that the ordir.a-c*"'-eli=upon by Hansen cperated outside Salt Lake City's reaso^=bi<=police powers- because "state law was and is' (and crohablv "aiwavs
has been) clear that bicvcles are to ride in the <£•>•-*,--,-on of "
motor vehicle traffic. . . . An ordinance that curoorcs" to allow
otnerwise is m cor.riict with state law." The tria^ cou~t
however, decided to leave to the trier of fact tnVimoact'o" its
decision en the issue of negligence. Hansen subsecuer.tiv
petitioned the supreme court for interlocutor/ review"." ~^he cou-t
granted Hansen's petition and transferred the*case'to'tn"s" court,
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 73-2-2 (A)
qe~ ut = h Cod«
Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (2002). We affirm.
—a

1. Eyre a_so filed a cross-motion for summarv -udcrr^-- C r t'- =
same suoject, which the trial court later denied, "-cwev^r -"-<=•
disposition of gyre's motion is not at issue in this^aopeal
2. Utah's Traffic Code expressly denies to local authorities tb*
power to create rules or ordinances that conflict w" t* »xistinc
state law. S_*e Utah Code Ann. § 45-6-16 (1998) ("A~locai
authority may not enact or enforce any rule or ordinance"-<*n
conflict with the provisions of this chanter.").

ISSUE AND STANDARD C? REVIEW
15
Hansen argues that the trial court erred in its statutcrv
interpretaticr. and, as a result, erred in denying his metier. fo~
summary judgment. Issues cf statutory interpretation oresen1cuestions of lav/ that we review for correctness. s « Tpopo""Weber Ccuntv, 2002 UT 103,114, 57 P. 3d 1073. We revliw the"
granting or denial cf a summary judgment motion for correct-ess
with no deference given to the trial court's decision.3 ~S~ee~~id.'
ANALYSIS
f

6
Hansen asserts that Dursuant to Salt Lake City Ut
Ordinance 12.80.C7C(1) (SUDO. 1993) he had an absolute -ic^- to
travel against the flow of traffic while in a desicnated b"-vcl»
iane. Tr.eretcre, he argues, the trial court erred T^ denyiVc'^'s
mcticn tor partial summary judgment. Eyre, in ccr.tras- 'arc—l
that section 12.80.070(1) conflicts with existinc scat* ^=v"a-^
is thus invalid. Because these statutory arguments are
mtertwir.ee, we actress them in concert.
<]7 Well-settled rules of statute-/ interpretation in S - r .-that

u*

[wjhen interpreting a statute, this court
locks first to the statute's plain lancuarre
to determine the Legislature's intent and"
purpose. We read the plain language of the
statute as a whole, and interpret its
provisions in harmony with ether statutes in
the same chapter and related chaoters. We
follow the "cardinal rule that the eeneral
purpose, intent and punoort of the whole act
snail control, and that all the parts be
interpreted as subsidiarv and harmonious rQ
its manifest object."
Miller v. W eavsr, 2003 UT 12,^17, 66 ?.3d 592 (citations
Moreover,
Is] tatutes are considered to be m pari
must be construed tcgetner
when they relate to the same person or tnmg,
to the same class of persons or things, or
3
m e parties agree that there is no dispute as to th» rrac-^al
tacts or tms_case. Thus, we focus our examination c ' t C
correctness or the trial court's legal conclusions." "

•00204S8-CA

have the same purpose or object. If it is
natural or reasonable to think that the
understanding of the legislacure or of
persons affected by the statute would be
influenced by another statute, then those
statuses should be construed to be in pari
materia, construed with reference co cne
another and harmonized if possible.
TTrah Countv v. Orem Citv, 699 P.2d 707, 709 (Utah 1935)
(footnotes omitted).
*[3
In this case, the statutory ace in question is Utah's
Traffic Rules and Regulations (Traffic Control Act:) . See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 41-6-1 to -135 (1993 & Supp. 2002) . Within the
Traffic Control Act, Article II contains the majority of the
statutes applicable to the use and operation of bicycles. See
id. § 41-6-83 to -SO.5. However, section 41-6-84 expands the
scene of applicable regulations beyond Article 11, staring:
Except as . . . specified under this article,
a person operating a bicycle or any vehicle
or device propelled by human power or a moped
has all the rights and is subiect to the
previsions of this chanter applicable to the
operator of anv ether vehicle.
Id. (emphasis added).
<[9
Thus, we must begin our analysis with an examination of
certain terms material to the instant case. First, Utah Code
Annotated section 41-6-1(55) defines "vehicle" as "every device
in, upon, or by which any person or property is or may be
transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices used
exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks." Id. § 41-5-1(55)
(1993). Clearly then, for purposes of the Traffic Control Act, a
bicvele is a vehicle. Section 41-5-1 also defines the term
"roadway." See id. § 41-6-1(39). A roadway, for purposes of the
Traffic Control Act, is "that portion of highway improved,
designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of
the sidewalk, berm, or shoulder, even though any of them are used
bv oersozis
riding bicycles or other human-powered vehicles." Id.
Thus, the areas of highway not considered part of the roadway
include, exclusively, "bermis]," "shoulder[s] ," and
"sidewalk[s]." Id. Accordingly, by both implication and plain
language, bicycle paths located on "that portion of highway
improved, designed, or ordinarily used for vehicular travel" are
part of the roadway and subject to the limitations of the Traffic
Control Ace. Id.
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*!lO Tr.e import of these terms to the instant case becomes clear
when we examine Utah Code Annotated section 41-6-53, which stat=~
that "[oln all roadways of sufficient widen, a vehicle sbail be
operated upon the right half of the roadway."4 id. § "41-5.53
(1993) . applying the definitions provided within t"^ "^a'^'c
Control Ac:t to section 41-6-53, " [o]n ail roldways of sufflci<=nwidth [whether or not traveling in a desicnated bicvcl<= oa-h] a
[bicycle] shall be operated upon the right half of the"roadwav *
Ic_ Therefore, absent a clear exception to this ru1 e w^nir tb«
Tratric Control Act, Sale Lake City may not, in the exe-ciV o = ~
its police power, allow bicycle riders to ride aaainstfth* H o w
of traffic.
til Hansen argues that such an exceotion exists -< r Ut=h Cod^
Annotated section 41-6-37 (1993). Section 41-5-37," in~"rei»va^ipart, ^sets torth: "A person operating a bicycle or a mooed uoor
a roaoway at _less cnan the normal speed of traffic at the tirr^
and plate and under the conditions then existinc shall >-~'de as
near as practicable to the right-hand edce of the >-o = ^-v=v I-<-"=" when' the rider is "overtaking and passinc another~v=-~ic"l^~' " ~ ~
proceeding m the same direction" of travel, "oreoarinc to mak- a
lett turn," or as "reasonably necessary" to avoid" cbst = cl = <= """Td"
§ 41-6-= 7(1) (a)-(c) . Section 41-6-37 further states: ""Z^~a ~ —
:sa
-Z-e5 patn3 tor bicycles nas been trovided adi=^=-'- --* a ~-»-~-.--v
£ha11 use
?-:Y Z „Z-r77- ,
t«e Path and not the roadwav." T^"^'
'
5 -=_-o-=/(^)^ ^empnasis acdeo) . We do not interpret this Ta-cu=~to provide the exception urasd by Hansen.
"
"
=•—s1--^112 The term ;'ad;acent" is defined to mean "not dista— »
"nearer, " or "having the vertex and one side in ccm~/~~""' M-r-->*tvecster's Collegiate Dictionary 14 (10th ed. 1999). fn U S £ ~ " ""
adjacent "u.ay or may not imply contact but always imollis ab=—-»
°r47(;r-r;-:-? ; f *<!-* s a - s k^-d i n between." Id,. Thus", "iection^Ic-o7(3) has application o m y m circumstances where a b ^ v c i patn lies not upon or within the borders of a roadwav "b'"t ins_eac when the path lies off of, and next to, the ^oa-wav
Only wnen tr.e patn is adjacent to (i.e., seoarate -"rcra) V - '
roadway is a rider required to use the path" inste=^"0rT~T~^ecge 01 one roadway.
~ ~ "~ --=---

cz tne rtacway and not adjacent to it. Moreover, even I* r-J
_acts c__tms case suggested that section 41-5-37(3) w=s~
app_icao_e, utter our general rules of statutorv c c — r - c - i c 4. Utan Czza Annotated section 41-6-53 articulates f —
exceptions to this -ale, none of which involve b ^ v c ^ s "
Utan Coce Ann. § 41-5-53(1) (a) -(d) (1993).
°~/<=~*.
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<=—
S_

"the provision more specific in application governs over the more
general provision." Hall v. Department of Corr., 2001 UT 34,^15,
24 P. 3d S53. Here, the Traffic Control Act specifically directs
chat n [o]n all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall be
operated upon the right half of the roadway." Utah Code Ann.
§"41-6-53. In contrast, section 41-6-87(3) is silent concerning
the direction of travel required or allowed. See id. § 41-687(3). Accordingly, the specific language of section 41-6-53
governs the direction of travel that vehicles, including
bicycles, must follov/ when on a roadway. Thus, bicycles, like
cars, must "operate [] on the right half of the roadway," and must
conform with the flow of traffic applicable to all vehicles. Id.
§ 41-6-53.
^14 Finally, while not controlling in this case, effective April
30, 2001, the Legislature amended section 41-5-37 to include the
following language: "A person operating a bicycle or moped on a
highway shall operate in the designated direction of traffic."
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-37(2) (Supp. 2002).
This language
reinforces the notion that the Legislature never intended to
permit bicycle traffic to flow against the direction of traffic,
recardless of the existence of bicvcle paths.5
CONCLUSION
<[i5 We affirm the trial court's decision denying Hansen's motion
for partial summary judgment. Moreover, we conclude that to the
extent that subsection one of Salt Lake City, Ut. , Ordinance

5. Hansen presented two additional issues on appeal, both.of
which essentially take the form of requesting from this court a
ruling that would foreclose the issue of comparative negligence
on remand. However, neither issue comports with the recuiremencs
of rule 24 of the Utah Rules cf Aooellate Procedure. See Smith
v. Smith, 1S53 UT App 370,^3, S35~?.2d 14 ("An issue is
inadequately briefed when the overall analvsis of the issue is so
13,ckino as to shift t^e burden of resee^c'"7 a"^^ cr-^nIT-HOT?r ro r*^.^
reviewing court." (quotations and citation omitted}). Thus, we
do not address either point. Moreover, from our reading of the
record, the trial court has yet to issue any definitive ruling on
these issues, thus, without a final order concerning these
matters, we are without jurisdiction to address them. See State
v. Morris, 2002 UT App 305,^7, 57 P. 3d 233 (" [W] ithout a final
order en the record, [this] court has no jurisdiction to hear an
aooeal.") .
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12.3C.070 cermics che riding of a bicycle againsc the flow of
traffic, ic is invalid.

w-sf- ^

W11 i i afn A. T h o m e J r . , / o u d g e

<l!5

^

I CONCUR

;

^

^-

*

=

— . ^r

Pamela T. Greenwood, u jcge

JACKS DM, Presiding wUdge (dissenting) :
resceccfuilv dissenc from mv ccileacues' decision.
Alchough che major icy opinion makes a persuasive case for
affirming cne trial courc's decision, 1 believe thai no cc r.s crue
:an Coce Ann. s -=1-6 -87(1) (1993) aa.5 L . ^ maiontv nas con,e ucses
several problems. These problems arise as che resulc of
scacucory scheme chac is hardly a model of clarity and
consistency.
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When conscruing a statute, we look firsc co
the plain meaning of the words used and their
scatucory concexc. The plain language rule
also requires thac we give effect co all che
terms of a stacuce so that no one provision
is construed in isolation. Furthermore, l1fif
doubt or uncertainty exiscs as to the meaning
or application of an ace's provisions, the
Courc should analvce the act m its entirecv
and harmonize its provisions in accordance
wioh che leoislacive mcent and ourcose.r '
r^1—
943
?.2d 542, 545 (Ucan 1937) vcicacicns cmiccec) .
^ -. ^
\\ ,
""i r ~i P> " ***" c ^ a v q f - r»«
ewe scacuccrv crcvisions coinz — ice __
-. L.*i*r__j. Uwwrsncr
—£
provision more specific in applicacion governs over the more
general provision. " Hall v. Decarcmenc of C rr^. 2001 UT 34, *IiO,
24 ?.3d 953 .
r> r^i

_ (-•

i

' "

~

*[1S When reading the scacute as a whole, I would conclude the
trial courc erred by ruling that seccion 41-S-37 prohibits che

20020493-CA.

u^- of a left-hand bicycle each. It is true that section 41-537(1) sets forth a general rule requiring bicyclists to ,!ride as
-ear as oraccicable"to the right-hand edge of the roadway." Ucai"
Cede Ann" § 41-6-37(1). However, it seems clear to me than
subsection"(1) does not apply in cases where a roadway has an
adjacent bicvele oath, since it never mentions bicycle paths and
since subsection. (3) does.
<[l9 Subsection (3) requires the use of a bicycle path when one
extsts. See Utah Code^Ann. § 41-5-37(3). Thus, while subsectio:
Vl) certainly sets forth a rule 'of general application, it does
not covern the specific situation where a bicycle path exists.
Thus7 "the provision more specific in application [subsection
(3)]'aoverns over the more general provision [subsection (1)]."
n

L11, W 20Q1 UT
zz±--_,

34 at

^10.

*J2Q To conclude otherwise, as the majority does, would pose a. w
least three serious problems that would prevent us from
harmonizing all portions of the statute. First, if we concluded
that subsection (1) requires bicyclists to stay to the right side
of the roadway even when a left-hand bicycle path exists, we
would necessarily create an exception to subsection (3) that the
legislature did not include. Specifically, subsection (3)
provides that 1! [i] f a usable path for bicycles has been provided
adjacent to a roadway, bicycle riders shall use the path and not
the roadway." Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-87(3). It does not say
"bicycle riders shall use the path and not the roadway, unless
the oath is ch the left-hand side of the roadway." Subsection
(3) requires the use of an existing bicycle path without
limitation as to which direction the bicyclist must ride, and
does not limit bicyclists to one side of the road.
^21 Second, to construe section 41-6-37 as the majority does
renders subsection (3) inoperable. If we concluded that
subsection (1) required bicyclists to ride on the right side of
the road and precluded them from riding in a left-hand bicycle
oath, then subsection (3) would be inoperable whether there is a
bicvele path on either side or both sides. See Utah Code Ann.
5 41-5-37(1) (requiring bicyclist to stay to the far right of the
"roadway'1); Utah Code Ann. § 41-5-1(39) (defining "roadway" as
"that portion of highway . . . ordinarily used for vehicular
travel") . The bicyclist wcuid then be required to ignore the
stecific mandate to ride in the designated bicycle path, whether
adjacent to the right or the left of the roadway, and follow the
more general rule by staying as far to the right of the roadway
as possible.
^22 Third, such a construction would render subsections (1) and
(3) contradictory, thus subverting the rule that we must
,f (
"harmonize its provisions . " f ,f Kimball, 943 P.2d at 643
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Addendum B

Order Granting Certiorari

D K ~ 4 20Q
JO

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE 07 UTAH
00O00

Tyler Hansen and The Workers
Compensation Fund of Utah,
Petitioners,
v.

No. 20030731-SC
20020498-CA
0102Q3125

Amanda S. Eyre and The Nature
Conservancy,
Respondents.

ORDER

This matter is before the courc upon a Pet.1r.10n for Writ cf
Certiorari, filed pursuant to Rule 45, of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure,
IT TS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari is
Granted.

FOR THE COURT:

Date

/

"

C h r i s t i n e M. Durham
Chief J u s t i c e

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that an December 3, 2003, a true and correct
copy of^the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United si-^t-.e:
mail" to the parties listed' below;
EDWARD'T: WELLSMEL S. MARTIN
MEL S MARTIN PC
5232 S COMMERCE DR
#D-292
MURRAY UT 84107
ROBERT L. JANICKI
MICHAEL K. WQOLLEY
STRONG & HANNI
9 EXCHANGE PL STE 600
600 BOSTON BLDG
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
LLOYD R. JONES
PETERSEN & HANSEN
230 S 500 E STE 400
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84102
and a true and correct "copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand
delivered to a personal representative of the courts listed
below:
THIRD DISTRICT, MURRAY DEPT
ATTN: SOPHIE / CATHY
4 50 S STATE ST
PO BOX 13 60
SALT LAKE CITY UT 34114-1860
PAULE7TS' STAGG
COURT OF APPEALS
450 5 STATE ST
PO 30X 140230
SALT LAKE CITY UT 94114-0230

Deputy Clerk

w

Case Nc. 20030731-SC
THIRD DISTRICT, MURRAY DEPT, 010203125

Addendum C

Minute Entry of the District Court

TN THS DISTRICT i'CQtfRT "OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND Cgn&*<siL.Tti'''ijrxz COUNTY/ MURRAY DEPARTMENT,
ST^.TjE OF UTAH
TYLER PIANSEN a/id "WORKERS
COMPENSATION ^i UN D,
Plaintiffs,

MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. 010203125
Honorable BRUCE C. LUEECK

"3 •

AMANDA EYRE and THE NATURE
CONSEP-VANCY,

Court Clerk: Linda Vance
June 5, 2002

Defendants.
The above matter came before the court en June 5, 2002, on
plaintiff's Motion for partial summary judgment and defendants'
cross motions f ° r partial summary judgment. Plaintiff was present
with counsel Edward T. Wells, defendant Eyre was present through
counsel Lloyd-R. Jones, and defendant Mature Conservancy was
present through counsel Robert JanickiIri this case plaintiff sought partial^ summary judgment in a
motion filed September 26, 2001. The court granted defendant
Eyre's Rule 56(f) motion for a continuance. Defendant Mature
Conservancy was later added -as a defendant and on March 28, 2002,
filed a cross motion for partial summary judgment. Defendant
Evre joined in that motion.- plaintiff then renewed his motion
for partial summary judgment. Each "party responded and the
moving parties each, replied.
BACKGROUND FACTS
The following facts do not appear to be in dispute.
This case involves an automobile-bicycle accident at
approximately 200 South and 500 East in Salt Lake "City.
plaintiff was traveling east-bound on 200 South, and at the time;
of the accident on the north side of the street, against^ motor
vehicle traffic, within a marked bicycle lane. The lane is
aclacenc to vehicle travel lanes and on - the north of the bicycle
lane there-is parking spaces
for vehicles. He -was just west of
5GQ East, intending to turn north onto 500 East when he was hit
by the vehicle driven by defendant Eyre -as she was turning west
onto 200 South after coming from the north, thus being southbound until'she began her turn and the bicycle and Eyre's vehicle
collided. Plaintiff was injured and sues Eyre and added her
employer Nature Conservancy.

ANALYSIS
The stanaards for granting summary judgment are well known
and will not be repeated. Plaintiff asserts that as a matter of
law tne court should grant his motion and declare that under a
Salt Lake City Ordinance he had the right to be traveling in tne
bicycle lane as he was and he was thus not negligent for doing
so. Defendants assert contrariwise that the SLC Ordinance is in
conflict with State law and thus plaintiff was indeed negligent
for traveling as he was in the eastbound bicycle lane against
vehicular traffic. Defendants thus claim the court should grant
their motion and find plaintiff was negligent.
Various statutes and ordinances come into play. At the time
of the incident in February, 2000, Utah Cede Ann. 41-6-37
required bicycles to travel
(1} . . .as near as practicable to the right-hand edge
of the roadway except when:
(b) preparing to make a left turn at an
intersection . . .
(3) If a usable path for bicycles has been provided
adjacent to the rcacway, bicycle riders shall use
the path and not the roadway.
U.C.A. 41-6-17(I) (h) provides that local authorities, "with
respect to highways under their jurisdiction and within the
reasonable exercise cf police power,7' may "regulate the operation
of bicycles . .
Plaintiff argues he was allowed to travel as he was by an
ordinance, SLC Ordinance, 12.30.070(1) which provided:
It is unlawful for operators of bicycles:
(K) When riding upon a roadway marked
with a bicycle lane to ride upon the
sidewalk or any portion of the roadway
outside the marked bicycle lane except
when making a left turn;
(Z) To rice upon the left-hanc side cf
a market bicycle lane
Plaintiff tnus argues that the court should declare that the
ordinance allows plaintiff to ride in a marked bicycle lane, even
if it is on the left side of the road and going against vehicle
traffic.
Utah law is clear that a local ordinance mav be enacted that

covers subjects already coverec cy state legislation but only if
scate law does nor foreclose local legislation and "the ordnance
in to *ay conflicts with existing state law."
The court finds that state law was and is (arid probably
always has been) clear that bicycles are to ride in the direction
cf motor vehicle traffic. C C A . 41-6-37(3) is not to the
contrary. The court reads chat statute to mean that bicycles are
still to ride with traffic, and if there is a bicycle lane, the
bicvcles should use the lane rather than the roadway. Subsection
(3) cf 41-6-37 does net give license to travel against traffic
even in a bicycle lane.
An ordinance that purports to allow otherwise is in conflict
with such state law. Further, any ordinance which is to regulate
bievcie traffic is to be within reasonable police powers under
41-6-17. To allow bicycle riders to ride against traffic, even in
a narked bicycle lane, appears to invite the very sort of
incident that is the subject of this lawsuit. However, the court
is without any facts (as pointed out by plaintiff) to find that
such an ordinance is net-within the reasonable police powers.
However, from a common sense standpoint it is well known that the
tendency cf most motorists, any law to the contrary
notwithstanding, when they are turning right onto a perpendicular
street, is to lock to their left for enccming traffic, but not to
look to their right. Thus, an ordinance that allows such biovole
traffic as plaintiff argues may or may net be within the police
powers of the City. The court is not ruling on that aspect as it
is without sufficient facts. Again, however, the ordinance
appears to create problems with bicyclists in the sane narrow
lane going in two different directions. It invites dangers to
motorists turning into oncoming bicycle traffic. The SIT
ordinance thus appears to not be within reasonable police powers
to attempt to allow such dangerous conduct. Those comments,
however, are not governing in this case.
However, more importantly, it is directly against the Utah
statute to travel by bicycle against the flow of'vehicle traffic.
Nothing in state law gives any indication that travel by bicycles
against vehicle traffic is approved.

judgment as a matter of lav/. The riding conduct is certainly a
factor a trier cf fact can consider in determining negligence.
The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that
plaintiff was not justified by ordinance nor state law in
traveling in the direction he was against traffic. That will be

one factor in their evaluation of negligence and comparative
necligence. The parties can marshal whatever evidence they have
a s \ o V n e safety (or lack thereof) of such conduct.
Neither party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
DATED this

""/

day cf June, 2002.

,iS
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Addendum D

Order Granting Permission to Appeal Interlocutory Order
Dated August 23, 2002

:N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OE UTAK

ocOoo
Tvler Hansen and The Workers'
Compensation Fund of Utah,
Plaintiffs and Petitioners,
No. 20Q20498-SC
010203125

v.
Amanda S, Eyre and The Nature
Conservancy,
Defendants and Resoondents

ORDER
This matter is before the Court upon a Petition for
Permission to Appeal an Interlocutory Order, filed pursuant to
Rule 5 of the Utah Rules of Aopellate Procedure.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Perm:
Aooeal an interlocutory Order filed on June 25, 2002 i:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED pursuant no Section 78-2-2(4), Utah
Code Annotated,
this matter is transferred to the Utah Court o:
Appeals for disposition. All further pleadings and
correspondence should be directed to that court.
For The Court:

kdiM^7/ teOJ-
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Addendum E

Petition for Writ of Certiorari

IN THE SUPREME COURT UTAH OF THE STATE OF UTAH

TYLER HANSEN and THE WORKERS
COMPENSATION FUND OF UTAH,
PETITIONERS,
vs.
AMANDA S. EYRE AND THE NATURE
CONSERVANCY,
RESPONDENTS.

\
;)
)
]

PETITION FOR WRIT OF
CERTIORARI

])

Case No.

:

Ct. App. No. 20020498CA

)
;
;

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

Robert L. Janicki
STRONG & HANNI
Attorneys for Appellee
The Nature Conservancy
9 Exchange Place #600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorney for Respondent
The Nature Conservancy
Lloyd R. Jones
PETERSON & HANSEN
Attorneys for Appellee .Amanda Eyre
230 South 500 East. Suite 400
Salt Lake City. Utah 84102
Attorney for Respondent
.Amanda Evre

Edward T. Wells
Mel S. Martin
Attorneys for Appellants
5282 South Commerce Dr., Suite D-292
Murray, Utah 84107
Attorneys for Petitioners
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in
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the majority's opinion affirming the ruling of the trial court deny Tyler Hansen
due process of law, as guaranteed by the Founeenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States and by Article I Section 7 of the Constitution of the State of
Utah, as defined in Bouie v City of Columbus, 387 U.S. 347 (1964)?

2.

Did the Court of Appeals err in deciding that Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1)
was invalid, being in conflict with state statutes?

3.

Did the Court of Appeals err, by invalidating an ordinance without joining the City,
contrary to the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-11?

IY
OPINION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
The Court of Appeals decision to be reviewed is Hansen v. Eyre, reported at 2003
UT App 274,

P.3d

. Judge Norman H. Jackson filed a dissenting opinion. A copy

of the opinion is contained in the Appendix.
V
JURISDICTION
This petition is taken from the Court of Appeals' affirmation of the Third District
Court's Order denying a partial Summary Judgment Motion of Plaintiff'Peritioner on the

1

issue of whether Plaintiff had a right to act in conformance with an existing city ordinance
that allowed a bicyclist to ride in designated bicycle lanes on either side of a city street.
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
Section 78-2a-4.

YI
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES ORDINANCES.
RULES and REGULATIONS
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules and regulations that pertain
to this appeal are identified in the Table of Contents, and are fully set forth in the
Appendix.
VII
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Summary of Proceedings.

Petitioners, Tyler Hansen and The Workers Compensation Fund of Utah, brought
this action for negligence. They claimed, inter alia, that Tyler Hansen (hereinafter
"Hansen") was lawfully riding his bicycle eastbound in the north bicycle lane on 200
South in Salt Lake City, Utah on February 17, 2000. As he approached 500 East, the light
was green for east-west traffic.
At that time, Amanda S. Eyre (hereinafter "Eyre") was driving south on 500 East.
She stopped at the red light on 200 South, and then commenced a right turn onto 200

i

South. As she crossed the bicycle lane on the north side of 200 South, her car and
Hansen's bicycle collided.
At the time of the collision, both Hansen and Eyre were in the course of their
employment. Eyre's employer, the Nature Conservancy Group (hereinafter "Nature") was
named as a defendant on a theory of respondent superior. Hansen was covered by Workers
Compensation insurance at the time of the accident. The Workers Compensation Fund of
Utah (hereinafter "the Fund") paid benefits to Hansen for his injuries, and was named as a
plaintiff based on its statutory subrogation rights.
The respondents claimed Hansen was negligent because he was not riding on the
right hand side of 200 South.
Petitioners asked the trial court to rule that pursuant to Salt Lake City Ordinance
12.80.070(1), Hansen had a legal right to travel eastbound in the north bicycle lane on 200
South as he approached 500 East. Respondents argued that State Law (Utah Code Ann.
§§41-6-53 and 41-6-87) required Hansen to operate his bicycle on the right side of the
roadway. They claimed the City Ordinance 12.80.070(1) conflicted with state law and was
therefore invalid. See R. 109-126
The trial court held a hearing and considered the parties' motions for partial
summary judgment. Petitioners argued that the City Ordinance was valid on the date of
the accident. Therefore, even if the trial court invalidated the Ordinance, the ruling could
only have prospective application. In addition, since the Ordinance clearly allowed Hansen

3

to be in the left-hand bicycle lane, his conduct could not be negligence per se. On June 5,
2002, the trial court denied the Motions for Summary Judgment and said:
The Court finds that State law was and is (and probably always
has been) clear that bicycles are to ride in the direction of motor
vehicle traffic.

An ordinance that purports to allow otherwise is in conflict with
such state law . . . Thus, an ordinance that allows such bicycle
traffic .. . may or may not be within the police powers of the
city. The Court is not ruling on that aspect as it is without
sufficient facts.

The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that
Plaintiff was not justified bv ordinance nor state law in
traveling in the direction he was against traffic (emphasis
added). R. 164.
The trial court also said the respondents failed to produce any evidence to support
their claim that the Ordinance conflicted with state law. For that reason, the trial court
expressly refused to rule the Ordinance was invalid. Id,
Petitioners timely filed a petition for permission for an interlocutory appeal pursuant
to Rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. They felt that judicial economy would best
be served if the trial court's inconsistent ruling were corrected prior to trial.
On August 23, 2002, the Supreme Court granted permission to appeal, and later
assigned ihe case to the Court of Appeals for disposition.
On July 25, 2003, in a split decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the
trial court. Moreover, they ruled the Ordinance was invalid.
4

On August 7, 2003, petitioners filed a petition for rehearing with the Court of
Appeals. (Appendix). They pointed out that the Court had decided only one issue, to wit,
that there was a conflict between state law and the city ordinance. Petitioners asked the
Court to reconsider its opinion because it did not determine whether or not its ruling would
be applied retroactively, which Hansen claimed would deny to him, under the holding in
Bouie v City of Columbus, 387 U.S. 347 (1964), due process of law as guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and by Article I Section 7
of the Constitution of the State of Utah.
On August 19, 2003, the Petition for Rehearing was denied.
B,

Summary of Facts.

On February 17, 2000, Hansen was ridin? his bicycle eastbound in a designated
bicycle lane on the north side of 200 South. As he approached 500 East, the traffic signal
for eastbound traffic was green.
Eyre was southbound on 500 East and stopped for a red light at 200 South. With the
light still red, she commenced a right turn onto 200 South. As she rounded the comer, she
collided with Hansen who was riding in the designated bicycle lane.
At the time of the collision, Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1)(I) specifically
allowed bicycle riders to ride on the left-hand side of a roadway within a designated bicycle
lane. At the rime of the collision. Utah Code Annotated §41-6-87(3) required a bicycle rider
to use a bicycle lane if one was available.

5

Petitioners are asking this Court to issue a Writ of Certiorari to consider the
constitutional implications of the Court of Appeals ruling, as well as other errors which
Petitioners believe are implicit in that decision.
Unless the issues are determined at this time, equity and judicial economy will be
frustrated. The parties and the Court of Appeals have spent considerable time and effort
without resolving the errors manifested in the trial court's inconsistent ruling. Failure to
resolve the due process issues, inherent in applying the appellate court's decision
retroactively, will guarantee another appeal, and a second trial of this case. Petitioners
presented the issue of whether or not the coun's decision to invalidate the ordinance could
be applied retroactively to affect prior conduct. However, the Court of Appeals refused to
discuss or rule on this issue.
The Writ of Certiorari will allow this Court to address these issues, and give a
definitive ruling on the issue of whether Hansen had a right to act in conformance to Utah
Code Annotated § 41-6-87(3) and Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(H) and (I). This is a
major question related to Hansen's negligence, if any. The trial court and appellate court
have ruled that Hansen was not entitled to ride his bicycle in conformity with the provisions
of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-87(3) and Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(H) and (I).

6

VIII
ARGUMENTS
Point I
THE COURT OF APPEALS DENIED THE PETITIONERS DUE PROCESS OF
LAW AS DEFINED IN BOUIE v. CITY OF COLUMBUS. 387 U.S. 347 (19641
Respondents told the Court of Appeals that Hansen could not legally ride in the left
bicycle lane because the city ordinance conflicted with state statutes that required bicycle
riders to ride only on the right hand side of a roadway. Petitioners argued there was no
conflict, but even if a conflict existed, invalidating the ordinance could not be applied
retroactively to affect Hansen's conduct. The provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to
*he Constitution of the United States and those of Article I Section 7 of the Constitution of
the State of Utah Due, as defined in Bouie. demand this result.
The trial court refused to invalidate the ordinance. However, it then said Hansen
was not entitled to rely on the ordinance. The trial court said:
The jury instructions will have to be properly tailored that
Plaintiff was not justified bv ordinance nor state law in
traveling in the direction he was against traffic (emphasis
added). R. 164.
The trial court did not discuss how it reached this conclusion, and it completely failed to
consider the constitutional implications of the decision.
As a general rule, if a municipality has the power to pass an ordinance, but exercises
the power in an unauthorized manner, the ordinance is still valid and binding until set aside
7

in legal proceedings instituted for that purpose. Regency Park L.P. v. City ofTopeka, 267
Kan. 465, 981 P.2d 256 (1999); 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 20.14 (3d ed. Rev.
1998); 56 Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporation § 315 at p. 353. This Court has held that an
ordinance is presumptively valid and remains valid until overturned. Redwood Gym v. Salt
Lake County Commission, 624 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1981); Murray City v. Hall, 663 P.2d 1314
(Utah 1983).
Neither the trial court nor the appellate court discussed or considered the effect that
retroactive application would have on Hansen's constitutional right to due process of law.1
The appellate court simply said the ordinance was invalid, and affirmed the judgment that
Hansen had no legal right to rely upon an existing city ordinance.2 They invalidated the
ordinance, even though the trial court said it had no evidence on that issue. The effect of
the appellate court's decision is to criminalize Hansen's prior conduct. That denies him due
process of law.

1

The usual effect of such a ruling would be for it to have only prospective
application. See Utah Code Ann. § 68-3-5; Regency Park, LP v City ofTopeka, 267 Kan.
465,981 P.2d 256; 6 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 20.14 (3d ed. Rev. 1998); 56
Am Jur 2d, Municipal Corporations § 315 at p. 353. Retroactive application of this
Court's decision would deny Hansen due process of law. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 387
U.S. 347, 353-55(1964).
2

Because the trial court ruled that the jury* would need to be instructed that Hansen
had no legal right to ride in the left hand bicycle lane, the only way such an instruction
could be legally justified would be to retroactively invalidate the ordinance which
allowed such travel and thereby remove the legal justification for Hansen's behavior on
February 17,2000.
8

The majority opinion conflicts with the mandate ofBouie, supra, that prohibits
retroactive application of a ruling on the validity of a statute or ordinance where retroactive
application would criminalize actions previously taken in reliance on the language of the
ordinance.
Long established principles of due process of law preclude the retroactive
application of the majority's ruling. Bouie v. City of Columbia, 387 U.S. 347, 353-55
(1964); Keeler v. Superior Court, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481, 470 P.2d 617 (1970); Arizona Dept of
Public Safety v. Superior Court of Maricopa Co., 190 Ariz. 490, 949 P.2d 983, 987, f.n.4
(Ariz. App. 1997) rev. den. 192 Ariz 276, 964 P.2d 447 (1997); People v. Benney 151 P.2d
1078, 1081 (Colo. 1987); Sodergren v. State, 715 P.2d 170 (Wyo. 1986); State v. Byers,
102 Idaho 159, 627 P.2d 788 (1981); State v Hull, 86 Wash.2d 527, 546 P.2d 912 (1976).
Tyler Hansen rode in the left hand bicycle lane in reliance on the plain language of
the ordinance. He was innocent of any intent to break the law. The law certainly cannot
expect a lay person to realize that there might be a conflict between a city ordinance that
expressly allows bicycles in the left bicycle lane and a state law. Not even the Court of
Appeals was unanimous in finding a conflict existed.
Retroactive application of the Court's ruling denies Hansen due process of law by
criminalizing behavior that was innocent when it was done. It subjects Hansen to the claim
he acred negligently when he followed the requirements of an extant city ordinance. Such a
result clearly violates Hansen's due process rights. Id. It is well settled law that:
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A State Supreme Court, no less than a state legislature, is barred
from making conduct criminal which was innocent when it
occurred through the process of judicial interpretation.
People v. Escobar, 3 Cal. 4th 740, 752, 837 P.2d 1100, 1107 (1992); See Bouie,
Supra. Due process protections ensure the citizenry fair warning of conduct that is
proscribed by law. A person is entitled to act in reliance on the plain language of existing
laws, without fear that their conduct may be later made punishable by a court who
subsequently finds a conflict between state and local law. Bouie, Supra; People v. Frazer, 8
Cal. Rptr. 2d 312, 982 P.2d 180 (1999). A major purpose of due process is to prevent the
unfairness resulting from alternating the legal consequences of events or transactions after
the fact. See People v. D.K.B., 843 P.2d 1326 (Col. 1993); Quails, Inc. v. Berryman, 789
P.2d 1095 (Colo. 1990). Since Hansen's conduct conformed to the express language of the
ordinance on February 17, 2000, a subsequent decision to invalidate the ordinance cannot
make conduct illegal that was legal when done. Bouie, Supra.
Poini II
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS INTERPRETATION OF UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 41-6-53 AND 41-6-87,
The Court erred in ruling the ordinance conflicts with state statutes and is therefore
invalid. As observed by the dissent, the pertinent statutes are neither clear nor consistant.
In Kimball Condominiums Owners Ass 'n v. County Bd. Of Equalization, 943 P.2d 642
(Utah 1997), this Court held that a court should give effect to all terms of a statute and
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harmonize its provisions in accordance with the legislative intent and purpose. Id. At 648.
The appellate court failed to follow this mandate.
There was no evidence of any kind presented to the trial court to support the
conclusion that the city ordinance conflicted with state law, or that it was contrary to any
legislative intent. The trial court said so. Thus, there was no evidence in the record to
support the appellate court's conclusion that the intent of the Legislature in enacting Utah
Code Ann. §§ 41-6-53 and 41-6-87 was to require without exception, that bicycles must
alwa\s be operated on the right hand side of a roadway3.
Similarly, there was no evidence in the record that the Legislature intended to
preclude operation of bicycles in a left hand bicycle lane if such a lane was provided. As a
matter of fact, no evidence of legislative intent was ever placed in front of the trial court.
The trial court expressly declined to rule on the validity of the Salt Lake City Ordinance
because the defendants failed to produce any evidence from which such a determination
could be made.4

3

Such a conclusion erroneously presumes, without analysis, that a bicycle lane is
part of the "roadway" as opposed to a "path adjacent to the roadway" as envisioned by the
legislature when it enacted § 41-6-87(3)
4

As Justice Jackson observed in his dissent, the majority's conclusion is in error
because in situations where there is only one bicycle path adjacent to a roadway, the
majority analysis would put a rider, who wished to travel in the direction where to use the
bicycle ]ane required him to travel on the left hand side would be required, in the position
of either having to violate § 41-6-53 which requires travel on the right hand side of the
roadway, or § 41-6 87(3) which requires use of the bicycle lane where provided with the
result that no matter what he does, he acts in violation of law.. This was clearly not what
the legislature intended.
11

When there appears to be a conflict between two statutes, the rule in Utah is that the
more specific controls over the more general. Hall v. Dep 't of Corrections, 24 P.3d 958
(Utah 2001). Certainly the express language of U.C.A § 41-6-87(3) and Salt Lake City
Ordinance 12.80.070(H) and (I) are specific while the language of §§ 41-6-53 and 41-687(1) are more general.
The appellate court said Hansen argued he had "an absolute right to travel against
the flow of traffic." This is not correct. Hansen has never claimed he should have a
general right to "ride against traffic." What Hansen argued was that he was entitled to rely
upon existing ordinances which require him to ride in a bicycle lane when one is provided,
and allowed him to choose which bicycle lane he would use.
The appellate court erred in its analysis. A bicycle lane is not part of the roadway.
Hansen was not riding "on the roadway" when he was in the bicycle lane. In addition, there
are exceptions to the general rule that vehicles (cars) must operate on the right side of a
roadway.
A "roadway" is defined as that portion of highway ... ordinarily used for vehicular
travel, exclusive of the sidewalk, berm, or shoulder, even though any of them are used by
persons riding bicycles ... Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-1(39). A "roadway" is defined as an area
ordinarily used for vehicular traffic of all sorts, with the exception of areas where bicycle
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travel is allowed. A bicycle lane adjacent to a "roadway" is not a part of that "roadway"
because only bicycle travel is allowed. Vehicle travel therein is expressly prohibited.'
This fact appears to have been recognized by the Legislature when Section 41-6-87
was adopted. Article 11 of the Motor Vehicle Code (currently Sections 41-6-87 through 416-90.5) was specifically adopted to regulate the operation of bicycles. At the time of the
subject collision, U.C.A. § 41-6-87(1) provided that a bicycle traveling at less than normal
speed should be operated as near as possible to the right side of the roadway. Certain
exceptions were provided. If a separate bicycle path (lane) was provided, a bicycle rider
was required to use the bicycle path (lane) and not the roadway. U.C.A. § 41-6-87(3).
By this specific language, it is clear that the Legislature recognized that a bicycle
]

ane that prohibits cars is not part of the roadway. If the Legislature considered the bicycle

lane to be part of the roadway, as the appellate court ruled, then the language of § 41-687(3) requiring the bicyclist to use the "path" and not the "roadway" would be meaningless.
Clearly, the Legislature in adopting subsection 3 envisioned municipalities designating
bicycle paths alongside the roadway. In fact, Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-17(h) specifically
grants to cities the power to regulate bicycle traffic.

- Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.52.140 provides: No motor vehicle shall at any time
be driven within or through, or parked or stopped within a marked bicycle lane, except to
briefly cross such lane to mm into an intersection, street, alley, driveway or other parking
area. Any vehicle so turning must yield the right of way to all bicycles within the lane that
are close enough to constitute an immediate hazard. No motor vehicle may use a bicycle
lane as a turning lane. On all roads with no bicycle lane, operators of bicycles have the
same rights, duties and responsibilities as operators of motor vehicles.
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Pursuant to this enabling legislation, and in harmony with U.C.A. § 41-6-87, Salt
Lake City adopted ordinances regulating bicycle travel. The ordinances prohibit other
vehicles from using bicycle lanes. A bicyclist is required to travel in a bicycle lane when
one is provided.6 Travel in a bicycle lane on either side of a street is allowed.7 Thus
Hansen's use of a left hand bicycle lane was contemplated.
Moreover, where only one bicycle lane exists, the appellate court ruling would
prohibit a bicycle from traveling in other than one direction on that street. The existence of
the bicycle lane, coupled with the prohibition to use the roadway when there is a bicycle
lane, would preclude riding in both directions.
Left hand use is logical. It allows a left hand turn to be made by a bicyclist without
having to cross in front of other vehicle traffic that might be on the roadway. The majority
opinion ignored the reality that bicycle lanes are created apart from the roadway for the
limited purpose of providing a safe riding area for bicycles. They typically are constructed
adjacent to the roadway as allowed by § 41-6-87(3). Motor vehicles cannot legally travel in
a bicycle lane. The language of § 41-6-87(3) indicates they are not part of the "roadway."
' Clearly, it is logical to assume that the city planners intended to create a safe lane of travel

6

Ordinance 12.80.070 provides: It is unlawful for operators of bicycles: (H) When
riding upon a roadway marked with a bicycle lane to ride upon the sidewalk or any
portion of the roadway outside the marked bicycle lane except when making a left turn.
7

Ordinance 12.80.070 provides: It is unlawful for operators of bicycles: (I) To ride
upon the left-hand side of any street, except when they are within a marked bicycle lane
or when riding upon a one-way street.
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for bicyclists adjacent to certain city streets (roadways) where there would be no conflict
between bicycles and motorized vehicles.8
As the dissent correctly observed, the appellate court's decision will make
U.C.A. § 41-6-87(3) meaningless. It is clear that the only purpose for adopting
U.C.A. § 41-6-87(3) was to provide for the creation of bicycle lanes that would not be part
of the general roadway, and which were to be used by bicycles and not cars. The dissent
reached the correct conclusion.
Point III
THE VALIDITY OF SALT LAKE CITY ORDINANCE 12.80.070(T> WAS NOT
PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR DECISION,
Salt Lake City Ordinance 12.80.070(1), as it existed on February 17, 2000, allowed a
bicycle rider to ride in left-hand bicycle lanes in Salt Lake City. Plaintiffs asked the trial
court to rule on a single issue, "does the ordinance give a rider the legal right to so ride?"
Defendants opposed the motion for partial summary judgment. They claimed the
ordinance was in conflict with state law. In response, plaintiffs argued that the defendants
had failed to produce any evidence or other factual basis that would allow the court to
declare the ordinance to be invalid. In addition, plaintiffs argued that even if the court
8

The scheme of the Salt Lake City Ordinances governing bicycle travel provides
for separate travel paths for bicycles where bicycle traffic and other motor vehicle traffic
are given separate areas in which to travel. This is clearly an effort to keep cars and
trucks separate from bicycle traffic for safety reasons. So long as bicycles are in the
bicycle lanes and other vehicles are in the traveled portion of the roadway, there is no
conflict between bicycles and other traffic.
15

declared the ordinance invalid, such a ruling could not be applied retroactively to
criminalize behavior that conformed to an extant city ordinance.
U.C.A. §78-33-11 states:
... In any proceeding which involves the validity of a municipal
... ordinance ... such municipality ... shall be made a party ...
The defendants did not notify Salt Lake City Corporation of their claim that Ordinance
12.80.070(1) was invalid. Salt Lake City was not made a party to the underlying action.
The lower court specifically declined to rule that the city ordinance conflicted with
the state statute because the defendants failed to meet their burden to show the ordinance to
be invalid9. R. 164. Defendants did not appeal this ruling.
However, without either party requesting such a ruling in their memoranda or
argument, the trial court ordered:
The jury- instructions will have to be properly tailored that
Plaintiff was not justified bv ordinance nor state law in
traveling in the direction he was against traffic (emphasis
added). R. 164.
Plaintiffs sought an interlocutory appeal of the trial court's order regarding Hansen's
right to rely upon an extant ordinance without such action being considered per se
negligent. Plaintiffs reasoned that the validity of the ordinance was not really the
controlling issue because unless the ordinance was determined to be invalid, and such

9

While the lower court refused to rule the ordinance invalid due to the lack of
evidence to support such claim, Section 78-33-11 would preclude a ruling on the validity
of the ordinance without Salt Lake City being a party to the proceeding.
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ruling was given retroactive effect, plaintiffs' partial summary judgment motion was well
taken. This was the theory behind plaintiffs appeal.
Because the lower court had declined to rule the ordinance invalid, it did not rule on
the issue of whether or not invalidation of the ordinance should be applied retroactively.
However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals discussed only one issue, "is the city ordinance
valid." The majority said the ordinance is invalid, and then affirmed the trial court. The
majority never discussed the issue of retroactive application of the ruling, and its effect on
the trial court's order quoted above.
The validity of the Salt Lake City ordinance should not have been decided by the
Court of Appeals. If the majority felt that the issue of the validity of the ordinance was
necessary to its decision, it should have remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing, with
directions that Salt Lake City be made a party as required by U.C.A. Section 78-33-11.
The constitutionality of a retroactive application of any ruling on the validity of the
ordinance should have first been decided. The Court of Appeals ignored that issue. As set
forth in Point I above, due process of law precludes retroactive application of a ruling that
criminalizes conduct after the fact.10 If Hansen is correct that retroactive application is
constitutionally impermissible, then it is immaterial whether or not the ordinance was

10

Unless a ruling that the ordinance is invalid is applied retroactively to
criminalize behavior in conformity with the extant ordinance, Hansen had the legal right
to ride in conformance with the language of the ordinance and, as a matter of law, his
motion for partial summary judgment should have been granted.
17

rivalid. He had a legal right to act in conformance with the ordinance as a matter of law
.nd his summary judgment motion should have been granted.
In conclusion, the trial court said it did not have any evidence to determine the
validity of the ordinance. However, it then made an inconsistent ruling by saying the
plaintiff had no right to rely upon the ordinance.
The issue of the ordinance's validity was not appealed. However, the appellate court
Ietermined the ordinance was invalid, notwithstanding the absence of the City as a party.
The majority ignored the issue of whether or not the ruling was prospective only, and by
mplication applied their ruling retroactively. Thus, the Court of Appeals decision denies
Hansen due process of law under the mandate of Bouie.
The City of Salt Lake has never been joined as a party, and it was error to determine
:he invalidity of its ordinance. U.C.A. § 78-33-11.
A Writ of Certiorari should be granted to allow these errors to be corrected.
IX
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Majority Opinion affirming the ruling of the trial court effectively
denies Petitioners due process of law as defined by the United States Supreme Court in
Bouie. Moreover, as noted by the Dissent, the majority decision is in direct conflict with
prior rulings of this Court, and failed to correctly construe and harmonize existing laws
related to operation of bicycles in a designated bicycle lane. Finally, the majority opinion
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held a city ordinance to be invalid, without the city being joined as a party. That violated
the mandate of Utah Code Annotated Section 78-33-11.
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioners respectfully request that the Court grant the
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
Respectfully submitted this / 0 day of September, 2003.
Mel. S. Martin, P.C.

£X«^
Attorney for Petitioners
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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9 Exchange Place #600
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Addendum F

Certified Copy of Salt Lake City Ordinance
as Amended September 9, 2003
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SALT LAKE CITY ORDNANCE
No.
£i, of 2003
(Amending bic\c;es rules and regulations;

AN ORDINALCE AMENDING SECTION 12.80.070, SALTLiKE CITf CODE,
RELATING TO BICYCLE RULES AND REGULATIONS - LTNLAWFUL ACTS.
Be it ordained hv the Citv Council of Salt Lake Citv. TlraV
SECTION 1. That Section 12.80.070, Salt lake City Code, pertaining to bicycle rales and
regulations - unlawful acts be, and the same hereby is, amended to read as follows:
12.S0.070 Riding rales and regulations-Unlawful acts.
A. It is ur.ia-.vfcl for operators of bicycles:
1•

When riding upon a sidewalk to fail to yield theright-of-wayto Pedes:rians and

sounu a warning device be tore overtaking or passing any pedestrian.
To net more than two abreast upon any street:
3.

To proceed other than single file upon any sidewalk:

4.

To carry extra passengers or carry any packages, bundles or articles which would

require the removal of the hand or handsfromthe handlebars of the bicycle;
To permit the bicycle such operator isridingto be towed by another vehicle or
bicycle:
•5-

To ride any bicycle upon any sidewalk within the central traffic district, as defined

:n Section 12.04.090 of this title, or its successor, and as described in Schedule 1 of thus title, set
out in Chapter i 2.104, or its successor, and made a pan hereof by reference, or on any other area
w:-re prohibit by s;gns. provided however, the forego.ng shall nor apply to police officers in
the scope and course of their entploymem;

7.

To ca..y more persons at a time than the number for which the bicycle is desisned

to can:.' on seatsfirmlyattached thereto;
8.

When riding upon a roadway marked with a bicycle lane to ride upon the sidewalk

cr any portion of the roadway outside the marked bicycle lane except when making a-left turn;
E. A person operating a bicycle upon a roadway at less than the normal speed of traffic at the
time and place and under the conditions then existing shall ride as near as practicable to the righthand edge of the roadway except when:
1. Overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the same direction,
2. Preparing to make a left mm at an intersection or into a private road or driveway,
3. Traveling straight through an intersection that has aright-rumonly lane that is in
conflict with the straight through movement,
4. Reasonably necessary to avoid conditions that make it unsafe to continue along the
right-hand edge of the roadway including fixed or moving objects, parked or moving vehicles,
bicycles, pedestrians, animals, surface hazards, or a lane that is too narrow for a bicycle and a
vehicle to travel safely side by side within the lane, or
5. On a roadway, other than a limited-access highway, designed and signposted for oneway traffic and which has two or more marked traffic lanes, m which case such person mavriae
as near to the left side of the left through lane as is safe.
C. A person operating a bicycle upon a roadway shall operate in the designated direct-ion of
era inc.
SECTION 2. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon the date of its first
publication.
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STATE OF UTAH,
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City and County of Salt Lake,

I, Beverly Jones, Deputy City Recorder of Salt Lake City, Utah, do hereby certify that
this document is a full, true and correct copy of Ordinance 64 cf 2003 amending Section
12.80.070, Salt Lake City Code, relating to bicycle njles and regulations - unlawful acts.
Passed by Salt Lake City, Utah Council action on September 9, 2003.

Published on September 22, 2003.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the corporate seal cf
said City, this 13th day cf September, 2003.

Addendum G

Pertinent Constitutional and Statutory Provisions

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENTS

A m e n d . XTV, § 3

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Cimenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoincinent.]
3. (Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

TRAFFIC RULES AMD REGULATIONS

41-6-1

Section
Record of violation not admis41-6-170.
Vehicles and equipment must be
sible in civil action.
in safe mechanical condition.
Conviction shall not affect cred41-6-171.
-6-163.
Renumbered.
ibility as a witness.
41-6-156 co 41
Repealed.
Improper disposition or cancel41-6-163.5.
41-6-172.
Emissions inspection — County
lation of notice to appear or
41-6-163.6.
program
(Effective
until
traffic citation — Official misconduct — Misdemeanor.
J a n u a r y 1, 19991.
Keeping of records — Making
Emissions inspection — County
41-6-173.
and forwarding of abstract
program [Effective J a n u a r v 1,
upon conviction or forfeiture
19991.
of bail — Form and contents
Development
of
standardized
41-6-163.7.
— Public inspection — OrHemissions
inspection
and
cial misconduct.
maintenance program.
Repealed.
41-6-174.
Diesel emissions program —
41-6-163.S.
Short title of act.
41-6-175.
Implementation — MonitorConflict with Federal Motor
41-6-175.5
ing.
Carrier Safety Regulations.
Repealed.
41-6-176 to 41-6-180. Repealed.
41-6-164.
Violation of chapter.
41-6-164.5.
A r t i c l e 17
Requiring or knowingly permit41-6-165.
ting driver to unlawfully operM o t o r Vehicle S e a t Belt U s a g e
ate vehicle.
Government-owned
vehicles
41-6-181
Short title.
41-6-165.5.
41-6-182.
Driver and front seat passensubject to chapter.
gers.
Appearance upon arrest for mis41-6-166.
41-6-183.
Exceptions.
demeanor — Setting bond.
J-1-6-1S4.
Enforcement.
Notice to appear in court —
41-6-167.
41-6-185
Penalty for violation.
Contents — Promise to com41-6-136'.
Compliance — Civil litigation.
ply — Signing — Release
from custody — Official misA r t i c l e 13
conduct.
T
o
w
T
r
u
c
k
a
n
d Impound Regulation
Violation of promise to appear
41-6-168.
[Renumbered]
as misdemeanor — Appearance by counsel.
41-6-137 41-6-1S8. Repealed.
Arrests without w a r r a n t s .
41-6-169.
41-6-189 to 41-6-193. Renumbered.
Repealed.
41-6-169.10

Section
41-6-155.

ARTICLE 1
DEFINITIONS OF TERMS
41-6-1.
*

Definitions.

^ - A l £ ? meaSa" street or highway intended to provide access to the
rear or side of lots orJ>uildings in urban districts and not intended .or
through vehicular traffic.
^ f i T 1 0 J in « e ^ o n <n-22-2.
(O) •'All-terrain tvpe I vehicle'' is used as defined in ^e-.on . . - - i -Authorized "emergency vehicle" means fire department vehicle,,
n o l i ven c S m b u i a n c e s . and other publicly or private^ ^ e d v e m c i e s
£ d e b a t e d bv the commissioner of the Department of Public bafeyy
M -Bicvc^ i - a n s everv device propelled by human power upon w m,n
any person m a y n d e , having twotandem wheels, except scooters and
^ { ^ s t P m ^ n s *verv motor vehicle designed for carrying more than 15
p a ^ n f c S i d l e d for.the ^
J
^
P
™
£ £ S £ 5
vehicle, other than a taxicao, designed ana ube^ IUI
persons for compensation.
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(o) Controlied-access highway" means every highwav, street, or roadway to or from which owners or occupants of abutting lands and other
persons have no legal right of access, except at points as determined bv the
P u ° \ l c authority having jurisdiction over the highwav, street, or roadwav.
(i) Crosswalk" means:
(a) that part of a roadway at an intersection included within the
connections of the lateral lines of the sidewalks on opposite sides of
the highway measured from the curbs or, in the absence of curbs from
the edges of the traversable roadway; and in the absence of a sidewalk
on one side of the roadway, that part of a roadway included within the
extension of the lateral lines of the existing sidewalk at right angles
to the centerline; or
(b) any portion of a roadway at an intersection or elsewhere
distinctly indicated for pedestrian crossing by lines or other markings
on the surface.
(8) •'Department" means the Department of Public Safety.
(9) "Divided highway" means a highway divided into'two or morp
roadways by unpaved intervening space or by a phvsical barrier or by a
clearly indicated dividing section constructed to imDede vehicular traffic
(10) "Electric assisted bicycle" means a moped with an electric motor
witti a power output of not more than 1,000 watts, which is not capable of
propelling the device at a speed of more than 20 miles per hour on level
ground, and which is not capable of increasing the speed of the device
when human power is used to propel the device at more than ?0 miles oehour.
^*
(11) "Explosives" means any chemical compound or mechanical mixture
commonly used or intended for the purpose of producing an explosion and
which contains any oxidizing and combustive units or other ingredients in
proportions, quantities, or packing so that an ignition bv fire friction
concussion, percussion, or detonator of any part of the' compound or
mixture may cause a sudden generation of highly heated gases, and the
resultant gaseous pressures are capable of producing destructive effects
on contiguous objects or of causing death or serious bodilv injury
(12) "Farm tractor" means every motor vehicle designed and used
primarily as a farm implement, for drawing plows, mowing machines and
otner implements of husbandry.
(13) "Flammable liquid" means any liquid which has a flashpoint of 100degrees F. or less, as determined by a tagliabue or equivalent closed-cup
test device.
^
(14) "Gross weight" means the weight of a vehicle without load olus the
weignt or any load on the vehicle.
(15) "Highway" means the entire width between property i^nes of everv
way or place of any nature when any part of it is otien to" the u*e of the
puohc as a matter of right for vehicular travel.
(16) -Intersection" means the area embraced wichin the orolongaron or
connection or the lateral curblines. or, if none, then the lateral boundary
nnes or the roadways of two or more highways which join one another
(a; Wnere a highway includes two roadways 30 feet or more apart,
every crossing of each roadway of the divided highway by an intersecting highway is a separate intersection; if the intersecting highwav
also includes two roadways 30 feet or more apart, then eve™ crossing
ot two roadways of the highways is a separate intersection"
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(b) The junction of an alley with a street or highway is not an
intersection.
(17) "Local authorities" means ever/ county, municipal, and other local
board or body having authority to enact laws relating to traffic under the
constitution and laws of the state.
^ (18) "Metal tire*7 means a tire, the surface of which in contact with the
highway is wholly or partly of metal or other hard nonresilien: material
(19) "Mobile home** means:
(a) a trailer or semitrailer which is designed, constructed, and
equipped as a dwelling place, living abode, or sleeping place either
permanently or temporarily, and is equipped for use as a conveyance
on streets and highways; or
(b) a trailer or a semitrailer whose chassis and exterior shell is
designed and constructed for use as a mobile home, as denned in
Subsection (19Xa), but which is instead used permanently or temporarily for the advertising, sales, display, or promotion of merchandise
or services, or for any other commercial purpose except the transportation of property for hire or the transportation of property for
distribution by a private carrier.
(20) "Moped" means a motor-driven cycle having both pedals to permit
propulsion by human power, and a motor which produces not more than
two brake horsepower and which is not capable of propelling the cycle at
a speed in excess of 30 miles per hour on level ground. If an internal
combustion engine is used, the displacement may not exceed 50 cubic
centimeters and the moped shall have a power drive system that functions
directly or automatically without clutching or shifti ng bv the operator
after the drive system is engaged. A moped includes an electric assisted
bicycle and a motor assisted scooter.
(21) "Motor assisted scooter** means a self-propelled device with at least
two wheels in contact with the ground, a braking system capable of
stopping the unit under typical operating conditions, a gas or* electric
motor not exceeding 40 cubic centimeters, a deck design for a person to
stand while operating the device, and the ability to be propelled by human
power alone.
(22) "Motor vehicle'' means every vehicle which is self-propelled and
every vehicle which is propelled by electric power obtained from overhead
trolley wires, but not operated upon rails, except vehicles moved solely by
human power and motorized wheel chairs.
(23) ""Motorcycle"7 means every motor vehicle, other than a tractor,
having a seat or saddle for the use of the rider and designed to travel with
not more than three wheels in contact with the ground.
(24) ~Motor-dnven cycle" means every motorcycle and motor scooter.
moped, electric assisted bicycle, motor assisted scooter, and every motorized bicycle having an engine with less than 150 cubic centimeters
displacement or having a motor which produces not more than five
horsepower.
(25> "Official traffic-control devices" means all signs, signals, markings,
and devices not inconsistent with this chapter placed or erected by
authority of a public body or official having jurisdiction, for the pumase of
regulating, warning, or guiding traffic.
(26) ''Off-highway implement of husbandry" is used as denned under
Section 41-22-2.
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(27) "Off-highway vehicle" is used as defined under Section 41-22-2.
(23) "Operator" means any person who is in actual physical control of a
vehicle.
(29) "Park" or "parking' 1 means the standing of a vehicle, whether
occupied or not, otherwise than temporarily for the purpose of and while
actually engaged in loading or unloading property or passengers.
(30) "Peace officer" means any peace officer authorized under Title 53,
Chapter 13, Peace Officer Classifications, to direct or regulate traffic or to
make a r r e s t s for violations of traffic laws.
(31) "Pedestrian" means any person afoot.
(32) "Person" means every natural person, firm, copartnership, association, or corporation.
(33) "Pole trailer" means every vehicle without motive power designed
to be d r a w n by another vehicle and attached to the towing vehicle by
means of a reach, or pole, or by being boomed or otherwise secured to t h e
towing vehicle, and is ordinarily used for transporting long or irregular
shaped loads such as poles, pipes, or structural members generally
capable of sustaining themselves as beams between the supporting
connections.
(34) "Private road or driveway" means every way or place in private
ownership and used for vehicular travel by the owner and those having
express or implied permission from the owner, but not by other persons.
(35) "Railroad" means a carrier of persons or property upon cars
operated upon stationary rails.
(36) "Railroad sign or signal" means a sign, signal or device erected by
authority of a public body or official or by a railroad and intended to give
notice of the presence of railroad tracks or the approach of a railroad t r a i n .
(37) "Railroad train" means a locomotive propelled by any form of
energy, coupled with or operated without cars, and operated upon rails.
(38) "Right-of-way" means the right of one vehicle or pedestrian to
proceed in a lawful m a n n e r in preference to another vehicle or pedestrian
approaching under circumstances of direction, speed, and proximity which
give rise to danger of collision unless one grants precedence to the other.
(39) "Roadway" means t h a t portion of highway improved, designed, or
ordinarily used for vehicular travel, exclusive of the sidewalk, berm, or
shoulder, even though any of them are used by persons riding bicycles or
other human-powered vehicles. If a highway includes two or more separate roadways, roadway refers to any roadway separately but not to all
roadways collectively.
(40) "Safety zone" means the area or space officially set apart within.a
roadway for the exclusive use of pedestrians and which is protected,
marked, or indicated by adequate signs as to be plainly visible at all times
while sec apart as a safety zone.
(41) "School bus" means every motor vehicle that complies with t h e
color and identification requirements of the most recent edition of "Minim u m S t a n d a r d s for School Buses" and is used to transport school children
to or from school or school activities. This definition does not include
vehicles operated by common carriers in transportation of school children
to or from school or school activities.
(42) "Semitrailer" means a vehicle with or without motive power, other
t h a n a pole trailer, designed for carrying persons or property and for being
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drawn by a motor vehicle, and constructed so that some part of its weight
and that of its load rests upon or is carried by another vehicle.
(43) "Shoulder area" means that area of the hard-surfaced highway
separated from the roadway by a pavement edge line as established m the
current approved "Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices," or that
portion of the road contiguous to the roadway for accommodation of
stopped vehicles, for emergency use, and lateral support.
(44) ^Sidewalk" means that portion of a street between the curb lines, or
the lateral lines of a roadway, and the adjacent property lines intended for
the use of pedestrians.
(45) "Solid rubber tire'' means ever/ tire of rubber or other resilient
material which does not depend upon compressed air for the support of the
load.
(46) "Stand" or "standing" means the halting of a vehicle, whether
occupied or not, other than temporarily for the purpose of and while
actually engaged in receiving or discharging passengers.
(47) ""Stop" when required means complete cessation from movement.
(48) uStopn or "stopping" when prohibited means any halting even
momentarily of a vehicle, whether occupied or not. except when necessary
to avoid conflict with other traffic or when in compliance with the
directions of a peace officer or official traffic-control device.
(49) "Traffic" means pedestrians, ridden or herded animals, vehicles,
and other conveyances either singly or together while using any highway
for the purpose of travel.
(50) 'Traffic-control signal" means any device, whether manually, electrically, or mechanically operated, by which traffic is alternately directed
to stop and oermitted to proceed.
(51)" "Trailer" means every vehicle with or without motive power, other
than a pole trailer, designedfor carrying persons or property and for being
drawn by a motor vehicle and constructed so that no part of its weight
rests upon the towing vehicle.
(52) 'Truck" means every motor vehicle designed, used, or maintained
primarily for the transportation of property.
(53) 'Truck tractor" means a motor vehicle designed and used primarily
for drawing other vehicles and constructed to carry a part of the weight of
the vehicle and load drawn by the truck tractor.
(54) "Urban district" means the territory contiguous to and including
any street, in which structures devoted to business, industry or dwelling
houses are situated at inter/als of less than 100 feet, for a distance of a
quarter of a mile or more.
(55) "Vehicle" means ever/ device in, upon, or by which any person or
property is or may be transported or drawn upon a highway, except devices
used exclusively upon stationary rails or tracks.
H i s t o r y : C. 1953, 41-45-1, e n a c t e d b y L.
979. ch. 242. 1 1: 198b, ch. 36. 1 1: 1987. c h .
33, } 1; 19S7, c h . 162. <* 23: 1996. ch. 208. ^
; 1998. c h . 245, * 2: 1998. c h . 2S2. * 17.
R e p e a l s a n d R e e n a e t r n e n c s . — Laws
979.*ch. 242, 5 1 repealed former § 41-6-1. as
amended by L. 1975 (1st S.S.;. ch. 9, 4 5.
*~ting definitions, and enacted present § 41-6-

A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1996 amendment, effective Aonl 29, 1996, added Subsection (10 ), retiesi^natintj the subsequent subsections accordingly: m Subjection (20) inserted ~A
mopea .nciudes .." at the end: ana in Subsection
'23) added *moped. electric assisted bicycle."'
The 199S amendment by ch. 245. effective
May 4. 1998. made a minor stylistic change m
Subsection \ 19Mb), added "and a motor assisted
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scooter" at the end of the last sentence in
Subsection '20); and added Subsection '21),
redesignating subsections accordingly.
The 1998 amendment by ch. 232. effective
May 4, 1998, made a minor stvlistic change in
Subsection '19)(b); and in Subsection (29) (Subsection (30) in the reconciled version) substituted "any peace officer" for "everv law enforcement officer^ and -Title 53, Chapter 10, Peace
Officer Classifications" for "Section 77-la-l."
This section is set out as reconciled by the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel.

C o m p i l e r ' s N o t e s . — An original chapter
reference appearing in the 1998 amendments
to this section was changed by the Office of
Legislative Research and General Counsel to
reflect a technical renumbering.
C r o s s - R e f e r e n c e s . — Handicapped persons, parking privileges, § 41-la-414.
Municipal regulations, § 10-8-30.
Words and phrases defined by statute, construction of, § 68-3-11.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

used exclusively upon stationary rails and
tracks". Thorpe v. Bamberger R.R., 107 Utah
265, 153 P 2 d 541 (1944). See present Subsection (53), defining 'Vehicle".

Ambulance service.
Construction and application.
Crosswalks.
Intersection.
Pedestrian.
Right-of-way statutes.
Roadways.
Vehicle.
— Horse.
Cited.

Crosswalks.
Even though many people may cross a street
at a certain place, a crosswalk is not created
since use, by itself, does not establish a rightof-way for pedestrians. Langiois v. Rees, 10
Utah "2d 272, 351 P.2d 638 (1960).
The statutory definition implied that there
was an unmarked crosswalk only if a s t r e e t s
sidewaik lor the edge of the traversable roadway) was intersected and continued on and if a
pedestrian way terminated at an intersection,
it terminated without crossing the street unless
it continued as a marked crosswalk. Langiois v.
Rees, 10 Utah 2d 272, 351 P.2d 63S (1960).

Ambulance service.
Ambulance operated by service registered
with public service commission, involved in
accident while making emergency run, was
"authorized emergency vehicle" within meaning of s t a t u t e and was in privileged status with
respect to speed limits and traffic signals despite contentions that ambulance driver was
negligent as matter of law for exceeding sueed
limit and ignoring traffic signals, that ambulance service was not "public service corporation" within the meaning of law, and that ambulance service was not authorized by l o c a l
authority."' Howe v. Jackson, 18 Utah 2d 269
421P.2d 159(1966).
Construction and application.
This title pertains preponderantly to motor
vehicles noc confined to tracks, such as automobiles and motorcycles and the like. It is a
Lr.::orm Act designed to n-<ruiate nonraii vehicular traffic on streets, and. therefore, expressly excludes steam trains, trolley and mt e r u r c a n cars. Thorpe v. Bamberger R.R., 107
L'tan 265, 153 R2d 541 (1944). discussing repeal of former laws and holding that the power
to require interurban trains :o stoo at through
streets was. by the legislature, granted to cities
entirely independent of Title 4 1 , U.C.A. 1953,
ar.d referring to Title 10. which contains most
or tne power granted by the legislature to cities
and towns.
Prior^to 1949 amendment, this section excluded from the operation of this act "vehicles

Intersection.
J u r y was properly instructed that site of
collision was ^intersection** under s t a t u t e prohibiting passing another vehicle without 100
feet of intersection in light of evidence that
crossing road intersected main highway from
both east and west and crossed it a t right
angles, that main highway was widened for
about 1/10 of a mile in both directions to provide extra lane for acceleration and deceleration in entering or leaving highway and that
there were stop signs at both east and west side
to warn oncoming trafiac; result was not
changed by fact that the crossing road was only
infrequently traveled dirt road and not readily
observable
to main
highway
traveler.
Hathawav v. .Man:. 21 Utah 2d 33. 439 P.2d 850
'1963).
Pedestrian.
"Pedestrian ,T includes a person whose car has
been disabled, so § 41-6-82(2), prescribing duties of a pedestrian on a highway, applied in a
case in which a driver of a disabled vehicle was
hit by the side mirror of a passing truck.
Marquez v. Pepsi Coia Bottling Co., S3S R2d
660 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
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41-8-18, Uniform application of chapter — Effect of local
ordinancesThe provisions of this chapter are applicable and uniform throughout this
state and in all of its political subdivisions and municipalities. A local authority
may not enact or enforce any rule or ordinance in conflict with the provisions
of this chapter. Local authorities may, however, adopt ordinances consistent
with this chapter, and additional traffic ordinances which are not in conliict
v/ith this chapter.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 7; C. 1943,
57-7-84; L. 1987, ch. 138, § 9.

Cross-References. — Powers and duties of
all acies, troiiLc regulations, § 10-8-30.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in Homsby v. Corporation of Presiding
Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saina, 753 P.2d S29 (.Utah Cc. Aop. 19SS).
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles
and Hi^nway TrnSc § 19.
C.J.S. — 50 CJ.S. Motor Vehicles § 43.
A-LJEL — Validity, construction, and enect of

statutes or ordinances forbidding automotive
"cruising" — practice of driving1 repeatedly
through loop of public reads through city, 37
A.L.R.4th 1110.

41-6-17. R e g u l a t o r y p o w e r s of local authorities — Trafficcontrol device affecting state highway — Necessity of e r e c t i n g traffic-control devices.
(1) Trie provisions of this chapter do nor prevent local authorities, with
respect to highways under their jurisdiction and within the reasonable
exercise of police power, from:
(a) regulating or prohibiting stopping, standing, or parking;
(b) regulating traffic by means of peace officers or official traffic-control
devices;
(c) regulating or prohibiting precessions or assemblages on the highways;
(d) designating particular highways or roadways for use by traffic
moving in one direction under Section 41-6-80;
(e) establishing speed limits for vehicles in public parks, which supersede Section 41-6-4S regarding speed limits;
(f) designating any highway as a through highway or designating any
intersection or junction of roadways as a stop or yield intersection or
junction;
»'g; restricting the use of highways under Section 72-7-403;
\h) regulating the operation of bicycles and requiring the registration
and inspection of them, including requiring a registration fee:
(i) regulating or prohibiting the turning of vehicles or specified types of
vehicles;
(j) altering or establishing speed limits under Section 41-6-4S:
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(2) This section does not prohibit attaching a trailer or semitrailer to a
bicycle or moped if that trailer or semitrailer has been designed for attachment.
History: L. 1941, ch. 52, § 73; C 1943,
57-7-150; L. 1973, ch. 33, § 29; 1987, ch. 138,
§ 91.

41-6-87.

O p e r a t i o n of bicycle or moped on and use of
r o a d w a y — Duties, prohibitions.

(1) A person operating a bicycle or a moped upon a roadway at less, than the
normal speed of traffic at the time and place and under the conditions then
existing shall ride as near as practicable to the right-hand edge of the roadway
except when:
(a) overtaking and passing another bicycle or vehicle proceeding in the
same direction;
(b) preparing to make a left turn at an intersection or into a private
road or driveway; or
(c) reasonably necessary to avoid conditions including, but not limited
to, fixed or moving objects, parked or moving vehicles, bicycles, pedestrians, animals, surface hazards, or substandard width lanes that make it
unsafe to continue along the right-hand eagQ. In this subsection, "substandard width lane* means a lane that is too narrow for a bicycle and a vehicle
to travel safely side by side within the lane.
(2) Persons riding bicycles or mopeds upon a roadway may not ride more
than two abreast except on paths or parts of roadways set aside for the
exclusive use of bicycles. Persons riding two abreast may not impede the
normal and reasonable movement of traffic and on -a laned roadway shall ride
within a single lane.
(3) If a usable path for bicycles has been provided adjacent to a roadway,
bicycle riders shall use the path and not the roadway.
History: L. 1941, ch- 52, § 74; C 1943,
57-7-151; L. 1943, ch, 65, § 1; 1978, ch. 33,
§ 30; 1987, ch. 138, § 92; 1989, ch. 44, § 1.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 7A Am. Jur. 2d Automobiles
and Highway Traffic § 249.
C.J.S. — 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 396(1)
ec sea.

A-LJR. — Sufficiency of evidence to raise last
clear chance doctrine in cases of automobile
collision with pedestrian or bicyclist — modem,
cases, 9 A.L.R.5th 826.
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ARTICLE 7
REGULATIONS APPLICABLE' TO DRIVING
ON RIGHT SIDE OF HIGHWAY,
OVERTAKING, PASSING AND
OTHER RULES OF
THE ROAD
41-6-53. Duty to o p e r a t e vehicle on right side of r o a d w a y
— Exceptions*
(1) On all roadways of sufficient width, a vehicle shall be operated upon the
right half of the roadway, except:
(a) when overtaking and passing another vehicle proceeding in the
same direction under the rules governing that movement;
(b) when an obstruction requires operating the vehicle to the left of the
center of the roadway, but the operator shall yield the right-of-way to all
vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon the unobstructed portions
of the highway within a distance constituting an immediate hazard;
(c) on a roadway divided into three marked lanes for traffic under the
applicable rules; or
(d) on a roadway designed and signposted for one-way traffic.
(2) On ail roadways a vehicle proceeding at less than the normal speed of
traffic under the existing conditions shall be operated in the right-hand lane
then available for traffic, or as close as practicable to the right-hand curb or
edge of the roadway, except when overtaking and passing another vehicle
proceeding in the same direction or when preparing for a.left turn at an
intersection or into a private road or driveway.
H i s t o r y : L. 1941, c h . 52, § 4 3 ; C. 1943,
57-7-120; L. 1949. c h . 6 5 . § 1; 1975, ch. 207,
3 14; 1987, ch. 138, § 52.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Backing.
Bicycle and truckEffect of passing from right to center.
"Half or* the roadway'* construed.
Instructions.
Negiigence.
Presumptions.
0 ues tion for jury.
Violation as evidence of negligence.
Cited.
Backing.
Statutes requiring t h a t vehicles keep to right
have no applicability to backing. Naisbitt v.
£ggett ? 5 Utah 2d 5,*295 ?.2d 332 (1955).
Bicycle a n d truck.
The driver of a truck who was on right side of
street and was not on, near to, or approaching a

crossing where both vehicles and pedestrians
might pass either or both ways had the right to
relax his vigilance and was not required to do
more than to maintain such lookout as would
prevent his colliding or coming in contact with
anyone on his side of street. Richards v. Palace
Laundry Co., 55 Utah 409, 1S6 P. 429 (1919).
Effect of p a s s i n g from r i g h t to c e n t e r .
While in case a street or highway is not used
by others one may drive on any part thereof.
yet. when a motorist or bicyclist passes from
right to left of the center of the street, he icses
some of his rights, and he may not be heard to
complain of the conduct of those who are on the
proper side of street to the same extent as
though he also were on the proper side.
Richards v. Palace Laundry Co., 55 U t a h 409.
1S6 P. 439 (1919).
In action by bicyclist for personal injuries
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sustained as result of collision with automobile
at intersection, instruction that motorist had
right to presume that every other person would
obey law by traveling on right-hand side of
road, and t h a t no duty rested upon motorisc to
stop or change course of automobile until he
had reason to believe that plaintiff was traveling on wrong side of street, was properly refused where it was disputed question as to
whether bicyclist was on wrong side of roadway.
Cheney v. Buck, 56 Utah 29, 189 P. 31 (1920).

Presumptions.
Where one who is operating his vehicle on
right side of street makes survey of condition of
street ahead of him. and in doing so he observes
no one coming on his side of street, but sees one
or more coming towards him on opposite side of
street, he has right to assume that such person
will continue onward on opposite side of street,
and not encroach upon his side. Richards v.
Palace L a u n d r / Co., 55 Utah 409, 136 P. 439
(1919).

"Half of t h e roadway'' c o n s t r u e d .
The reasonable interpretation of "half of the
roadway*' is t h a t it means half of the roadway
as it exists at the time it is being traveled and
not half of the roadway as it may have been laid
out originally. Patton v. Kirkmam 109 Utah
487, 167 P.2d 282 (1946).

Question for jury.
In action by bicyclist for personal injuries
sustained as result of collision with automobile
at intersection, whether bicyclist was on right
side of traveled road held for jury. Cheney v.
Buck, 56 Utah 29, 189 P. 31 (1920).
In personal-injury action arising out of automobile-truck collision on highway, ultimate
question of fact as to which of two drivers failed
to keep his vehicle upon proper side of road was
for jury. Moser v. Zion's CO-OD. Mercantile Inst.,
114 Utah 53, 197 P.2d 136 (1943).

Instructions.
Where collision takes place upon street having four trafnc lanes, it is proper to instruct as
to duty of defendant to use right trafSc lane.
and as to duty of the respective parties to use
lane 4 r a t h e r t h a n lane 3, where the evidence
warrants such instruction. Thomas v. Sadieir,
108 Utah 552, 162 P.2d 112 (1945).
Negligence.
The strongest kind of presumption of negligence prevails against party driving on wrong
side of road. Staton v. Western Macaroni Mfg.
Co., 52 U t a h 426, 174 P. 321 (1913).

Violation a s e v i d e n c e of n e g l i g e n c e .
Violations of standards ot safer/ set by statute are regarded as prima facie evidence of
negligence subject only to justification or excuse. Platis v. United States. 283 F. SUDD. 254
(D. Utah 1968), aff'd, 409 ?.2d 1009 (10th Cir.
1969).
C i t e d in State v. Sierra, ' 54 P2d 972 (Utah
Ct. App. 1988).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
C.J.S. — 60A C.J.S. Motor Vehicles § 268.
A.LJR- — Automobiles: liability for U-turn
collisions, 53 A.L.R.4th 349.

41-6-53.5. Left lane restrictions — Exceptions — Other
lane restrictions.
(1) A person operating a vehicle drawing a trailer or semitrailer or operating
a vehicle or combination of vehicles with a gross vehicle weight of 12,001 or
more pounds may not operate the vehicle or vehicles in the left most lane of a
highway or section of a highway if the highway has three or more lanes in the
same direction.
(2) This section does not apply to a vehicle:
(a) preparing to turn left or taking a highway split or exit on the left;
(b) responding to emergency conditions;
(c) avoiding actual or potential tramc moving onto the ri^ht lane from
an acceleration or merging lane; or
(d) following direction signs that direct use of a designated lane.
(3) (a) The Department of Transportation or local authorities may designate a specific lane or lanes of travel for any type of vehicle on a highway
or portion of a highway under their respective jurisdiction for the:"
(i) safetv of the public;
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'.80.070 Riding rules and regulations-Unlawful acts.
is unlawful for operators of bicycles:
When riding upcn a sidewalk to fail to yield the right-of-way to pedestrians and sound a
warning device before overtaking or passing any pedestrian;
. To ride more than two abreast upon any street:
.. To proceed other than single file upon any sidewalk;
i To c-rrv extra passenoers or carry any packages, bundles or articles which would require
' the removal of the hand or hands from the handlebars OT the bicycle;
:. To permit the bicycle such operator is riding to be towed by another vehicle or bicycle;
: To rde any bicycle upon any sidewalk within the central traffic district, as defined in Section
' 19 0* 090 of this title, or its successor, and as described in Schedule 1 of this title, set out
in~ChaD*er 12 104, or its successor, and made a part hereof by reference, or on any other
area where prohibited by signs, provided, however, the foregoing shall not apply to police
officers in the scope and course of their employment;
3. To carry more persons at a time than the number for which the bicycle is designed to cam/
on seats firmly attached thereto;
-i When ridina upon a roadway marked with a bicycle lane to rice upcn the sidewalk or any
" portion of the roadway outside the marked bicycle lane except when making a leu turn;
I T - rid= uoon the left-hand side of any street, except when they are within a marked bicycle
raneor when riding upon a one-way street. (Ord. 16-39 § 1, 1989; prior code Title 4 . , Art.
13 §273)

